Pipes May Be Defective, But Owners Lack Standing
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United States District Court in Minnesota has determined that Steven and Cecilia Thundander cannot make a class-action claim against Uponor, Inc. over the plumbing in their home, as they do not have Article III standing. In this situation, the alleged defect is that Uponor made fraudulent claims that the pipes met National Sanitation Foundation (NSF) standards for use in potable water systems. Uponor submitted samples of other pipes, and their substitution was discovered when the NSF made an inspection of the manufacturing facility. The court noted that “the Thunanders contend that Uponor failed to inform homeowners, plumbers and consumers that it had been selling pipe that failed to meet NSF toxicity requirements at the time of sale and installation.”
The Court noted that the Thunanders have not tested their piping to determine if they “demonstrate toxicity or lack of compliance with the NSF 61 standards,” noting also that the Complaint seeks to require Uponor to instruct the plaintiffs on “how to test the piping and water to determine the level of risk.” Lacking testing, the Court could not find that the Thundanders have defective pipes. The Court found that the “Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead an injury in fact sufficient to confer standing as to their product liability claims.”
The Court also concluded that it could not determine if the Plaintiff’s warranty actions could not be applied, as they “have failed to allege a plausible defect.” Even in the presence of a defect, the Court noted that more than eight years had passed before the filing of the suit, when the warranties under both Indiana and Minnesota law have a four-year statute of limitations. The Court also rejected the Thunanders tort claims, once again because “Plaintiffs have not tested their pipes,” noting that “a tort requires the existence of an injury.”
In conclusion, Judge Nelson rejected the entirety of the complaint, granting the motions to dismiss by the defendants. However, despite the problems with the Thunanders’ claims, she found that they were not “patently frivolous or groundless.” Therefore, she denied attorney fees requested by one of the defendants.
Read the court’s decision…
Homebuilding on the Rise in Nation’s Capitol
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Is the homebuilding crunch over in DC? The Washington Post has reported that while new home construction is up throughout the country, in the DC area, construction has reached levels last seen in 2006. From January to August 2012, there were more than 19,000 building permits issued in the area, nearly doubling the number issued by that point in 2011.
While building is on a quicker pace, what’s being built has changed. As compared to 2006, there are more townhomes, condos, and smaller homes being built. The article notes that 11 percent of new construction is condos, while in 2006, it was only 5 percent.
Read the full story…
Appropriation Bill Cuts Military Construction Spending
June 15, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Hill reports that HR 2055, the Military Construction, Veterans Affairs (VA) and Related Agencies bill, has passed with only five votes in opposition. The bill cuts the budget for military construction spending by $2.6 billion due to anticipated base closures.
The bill includes $186 million for family housing construction by the Army, $100 million for family housing construction by the Navy and Marines, and $84 million for family construction by the Air Force, with an additional $50 million allocated for the DOD outside the military branches. By the act, these funds will remain available until September 30, 2016.
Read the full story…
Read HR 2055
Developer’s Fraudulent Statements Are His Responsibility Alone in Construction Defect Case
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Court of Appeals ruled on December 21 in the case of Helm v Kingston, a construction defect case. After purchasing what was described as “an extremely well-built” two-bedroom townhouse, Mr. Kingston made complaints of construction defects. Greenway Development did not repair the defects to Kingston’s satisfaction, and he filed notice of suit. In his suit, he claimed that GDI and its president, John Helm, had committed fraud and negligent misrepresentation. Kingston claimed that Helm “fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of workmanship was atrocious.” Helms brought a counterclaim that Kingston’s suit was frivolous.
About four years after Kingston purchased the townhome, the suit proceeded to trial. The trial court determined that Helm was not “liable in his individual capacity,” but this was reversed at appeal.
A second trial was held ten years later on the question of whether Kingston’s unit was a townhome or an apartment. A jury found that Helm “engaged in a false, misleading or deceptive act or practice that Kingston relied on to his detriment.” Kingston was awarded $75,862.29 and an additional $95,000 in attorney fees by the jury. Helms made an unsuccessful appeal to the Appeals Court, after which Kingston was awarded an additional $10,000. Helms then made an unsuccessful appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, which lead to an additional $3,000 for Kingston. There was also a verdict of $48,770.09 in pre-judgment interest and “five percent post-judgment interest accruing from the date of the judgment until the time the judgment is paid. Helm appealed.
In his appeal, Helm raised seven issues, which the court reorganized into five Kingston raised one issue on cross-appeal.
Helms’ first claim was that Kingston “failed to satisfy the requirement of” Texas’s Residential Construction Liability Act and that by not filing under the RCLA, Kingston’s fraud and misrepresentation claims were preempted. Further Helms claimed that the RCLA limited Kingston’s damages. The court rejected this, as the RCLA deals with complaints made to a contractor and not only did Helm fail to “conclusively establish” his “status as a ‘contractor’ under the statutory definition,” Helm testified that he was “not a contactor” at the pre-trial hearing.
Helms’s second claim was that Kingston’s later claim of a misconstructed firewall should be barred, claiming that Kingston “‘had knowledge of a defect in the firewall’ as early as 1997 but did not assert them until 2007.” The court rejected this because Kingston’s claim was that “Helm ‘fraudulently induced Kingston to believe that the townhouse evidenced the highest quality of workmanship when in fact the quality of the workmanship was atrocious.’”
Helms also challenged whether his statements that the residence was of “good quality” constituted fraud and misrepresentation under Texas’s Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act. The court concluded that Helm was in a position to make knowledgeable statements and further that “residential housing units are not artistic works for which quality is inherently a matter of subjective judgment.” Helm also claimed that Kingston could have avoided certain repair expenses through the “exercise of reasonable care.” Helms argued that the repairs could have been made for $6,400. The court disagreed, as these claims were cited only to invoke the DTPA, and that later petitions established additional defects.
Helms’s next claim was that he was not allowed to designate responsible third parties. The court rejected this because there GDI represented matters concerning the residence only through Helm’s statements. The court noted that “Helm is correct that?third parties may be liable for fraud if they ‘participated in the fraudulent transactions and reaped the benefits,’” but they note that “Helm never specifically alleged that GDI or CREIC participated in Helm’s alleged fraudulent transactions.
The final issue in the decision was about court costs, and here the court denied claims on both sides. Helm argued that the award of legal fees were excessive, as they exceeded the actual damages. The court noted that they “may not substitute our judgment for that of the jury,” and also that “the ratio between the actual damages awarded and the attorney’s fees is not a factor that determines the reasonableness of the fees.” But the court also rejected Kingston’s claim for post-judgment interest on $10,312.30 that Helm had deposited in the trial court’s registry. The court noted that the monies were to be paid out upon final judgment, but the mandate did not include any reference to interest.
Read the court’s decision…
No Coverage For Construction Defects When Complaint Alleges Contractual Damages
September 1, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
The underlying plaintiff’s allegations contended the contractor was in breach of contract for construction defects caused in building her home. Accordingly, the court found no coverage.See Nat’l Builders and Contractors Ins. Co. v. Slocum, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81694 (S.D. Miss. July 26, 2011).
Slocum Construction LLC sold a home it built to Laura Peterson. Subsequently, Peterson filed suit, alleging a breach of the contract and seeking rescission and cancellation of the contract. Peterson further alleged at least thirty-three specific defects in the construction of the house.
Slocum tendered to its insurer, National Builders and Contractors Insurance Company (NBCI). NBCI filed suit for a declaratory judgment.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Plaintiffs In Construction Defect Cases to Recover For Emotional Damages?
March 16, 2011 — March 16, 2011 - Construction Defect Journal Staff
A recent post to the Markusson, Green, Jarvis Blog reports on an important appeals decision which promises to impact construction defect litigation in Colorado.
The post provides analysis on the recovery of inconvenience damages. The focus of the piece is centered on Hildebrand v. New Vista Homes II, LLC, 08CA2645, 2010 WL 4492356 (Colo. Ct. App. Nov. 10, 2010), wherein it was held that " the plain language of Construction Defect Action Reform Act permits recovery of damages for inconvenience, and that the trial court did not err by allowing inconvenience damages to go to the jury".
According to the MGJ Blog "The Hildebrand decision is important because it provides Construction Defect Plaintiffs with a foothold for collecting emotional damages. While several questions of law remain as to who or under exactly what circumstances a Plaintiff may recover these types of damages, the Hildebrand case has clearly set forth that emotional damages may be considered as part of actual damages pursuant to CDARA."
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School District Settles Construction Lawsuit
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Franklin County, Pennsylvania Public Opinion reports that an area school is coming to an end with its construction lawsuit. The school district was sued by its contractors for a combined $1.4 million, which the school district withheld when the project was not completed on schedule. Lobar Inc. claimed that the district additionally owed interest and should pay attorney fees. The school claimed that only $1.15 million was due under the contract. Under the settlement, they will be paying $1.136 million.
Read the full story…
Contractor Removed from Site for Lack of Insurance
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The MetroWest Daily News reports that a demolition firm was told to leave the construction site at Natick High School since their failure to have workers compensation insurance makes them unable to work on the project. The contractor, Atlantic Dismantling and Site Construction, Inc. may have been working illegally since September.
The equipment that Atlantic had rented for the job was repossessed in August. Brait Builders Corp, the general contractor for the site had rented equipment so Atlantic could continue their work.
Their lack of insurance was discovered when a worker had a minor job-related injury. The state had issued a stop-work order for the firm and they could not legally bid on public projects. The school system did not receive any notice of this, and the school’s facilities director said of the general contractor, “chances are Brait never heard of anything either.”
Read the full story...
Vegas Hi-Rise Not Earthquake Safe
July 12, 2011 — CDJ Staff
If an earthquake hit Las Vegas, the Harmon Tower would not withstand it. A report from Weidlinger Associates told MGM Resorts that “in a code-level earthquake, using either the permitted or current code specified loads, it is likely that critical structural members in the tower will fail and become incapable of supporting gravity loads, leading to a partial or complete collapse of the tower.” The inspection came at the request of county officials, according to the article in Forbes.
According to Ronald Lynn, directory of the building division in the county’s development services division, “these deficiencies, in their current state, make the building uninhabitable.” The county is concerned about risks to adjacent buildings.
MGM Resorts is currently in litigation, separate from the stability issues, with Perini Corp., the builders of Harmon Tower.
Read the full story…
Homeowners Must Comply with Arbitration over Construction Defects
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has upheld a decision by the Superior Court of Kern County that homeowners must comply with arbitration procedures in their construction defect claim. The California Court of Appeals ruled on December 14 in the case of Baeza v. Superior Court of Kern County, denying the plaintiff’s petition that the trial court vacate its order.
The plaintiffs in the case are homeowners in various developments built by Castle & Cook. The homes were sold with a contract that provided for “nonadversarial prelitigation procedures, including mediation, and judicial reference.” The homeowners made defect claims and argued that Castle & Cooke failed to comply with statutory disclosure requirements and that some of the contracts violate related statutes.
The appeals court found that there was no ground for appeal of the lower court’s order to continue with prelitigation procedures. The court noted that the plaintiffs could not seek a review of the mediation until a judgment was issued, but that then the issue would be moot. The court felt that there were issues presented that needed clarification, and so they reviewed this case. This was cleared for publication.
The court considered the intent of the legislature in passing the Right to Repair Act, noting that “under the statutory scheme, the builder has the option of contracting for an alternative nonadversarial prelitigation procedure,” as established in Chapter 4. The court noted that Chapter 4 “contains no specifics regarding what provisions the alternative nonadversarial contractual provisions may or must include.”
The plaintiffs contended that the builder was in violation of the standards set out in Section 912, however the court responded that these sections set out one set of procedures, but they concluded that “if the Legislature had intended the section 912 disclosure provisions…it could have made the requirements applicable to all builders by locating them in a section outside Chapter 4.”
Read the court’s decision…
California Construction Bill Dies in Committee
July 21, 2011 — CDJ Staff
AB 20, which its sponsor, Linda Halderman (R-Fresno), stated would discourage class action lawsuits against builders and protect jobs in the construction industry, has died in committee. Although the Business Journal reported in June that Haldeman was promoting the bill during a talk in her district and the bill is still on her web site, the California Assembly reports that the bill failed in committee on March 15, 2011. It is possible that the bill could be reconsidered, but the Assembly Committee on Judiciary sees the bill as responding to issues quieted by SB 800 which gives builders the right to repair alleged defects before any suit can be filed.
Read the full story…
Contractor Manslaughter? Safety Shortcuts Are Not Worth It
August 11, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
It’s been a while since I discussed the importance of safety. But, a recent article on ENR.com compelled this brief article. Don’t shortcut safety — you could be facing serious criminal repercussions.
A New York crane company owner and one of his employees are each facing a second-degree manslaughter charge for the death of two construction workers.  The charges stem from the collapse of a crane in New York City. The district attorney determined that the crane owner cut a few corners to reduce its operation costs, significantly sacrificing safety.
Another example was the 2010 trial of another New York crane operator who was charged with manslaughter. In that case, the criminal charges failed to stick, but an administrative judge found that the contractor used a damaged sling to support the steel collar binding the tower-crane mast to the 18th floor of a high-rise building being constructed. The company also used four slings instead of the eight, as specified by the crane manufacturer; improperly attached the slings and failed to pad or soften them.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Save a Legal Fee: Prevent Costly Lawsuits With Claim Limitation Clauses
April 25, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Cousel
Ever had that lingering problem with a contracting partner that went away for awhile and then came back to bite you ? years later? In Washington, construction contract claims can be raised for up to six years after substantial completion. Six years!? Why would I want to wait that long to find out if I have a problem? You don’t have to.
Over the past few years, I have discussed the notion of “contractual claim periods” on The Builders Counsel. For today’s Save a Legal Fee column, I cannot think of a better topic. These provisions are specifically intended to save you from unnecessary legal fees that might arise if a problem goes unnoticed for too long.
Contractual claim periods are simply a way to reduce the amount of time that a contracting party has to raise a claim against its contracting partner. For example, a subcontractor might require that a general contractor raise any claim that it might have ? for defective or incomplete work, injury, damages, etc ? within a particular amount of time or forever lose the ability to raise the claim in a legal proceeding.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Construction Defect Notice in the Mailbox? Respond Appropriately
August 4, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Recently, I have seen a rash of ignored construction defect notices. What is a construction defect notice? It’s a statutorily required notice, sent from a homeowner to a contractor, listing a number of defects found at their property. If you get one, don’t ignore it.
The Revised Code of Washington includes a number of provisions intended for residential construction disputes. Among them is the “Notice to Customer” requirement in RCW 18.27.114, which can preempt a contractor’s lien rights, and the “Notice of Construction Defects” found in RCW 64.50.020.
The Notice of Construction Defects is a standard notice mandated by RCW 64.50, a chapter in the Revised Code of Washington, intended to provide a pre-litigation resolution process for contractors and consumers. The chapter applies only to those losses “caused by a defect in the construction of a residence or in the substantial remodel of a residence.”(See “Action” RCW 64.50.010).
Unfortunately, many contractors will simply ignore these notices or tell the homeowner to make a warranty claim. But, the notice actually provides a contractor with a forty-five (45) day window to alleviate the dispute.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Although Property Damage Arises From An Occurrence, Coverage Barred By Business Risk Exclusions
July 8, 2011 — Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
The homeowners hired the insured to raise the structure of their home twenty-four inches above the flood zone. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. Peerboom, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58985 (S.D. Miss. June 2, 2011). When the insured’s crew returned from lunch one day, they found the house had fallen from hydraulic jacks being used to raise the structure a few inches at a time. There was substantial damage to the entire structure.
The homeowners sued, asserting several claims, including negligence and breach of contract. The complaint alleged the homeowners entered a contract with the insured to raise their structure while maintaining its integrity. However, the insured failed to use proper equipment, which caused the house to fall and be completely destroyed.
The insured tendered the claim to its insurer, Lafayette Insurance Company. Lafayette defended under a reservation of rights and filed suit for a declaratory judgment. Lafayette’s subsequent motion for summary judgment contended there was no “occurrence” alleged in the underlying complaint and, even if there was, the business risk exclusions barred coverage.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Limiting Plaintiffs’ Claims to a Cause of Action for Violation of SB-800
November 18, 2011 — Samir R. Patel, Esq. and Todd E. Verbick, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP
There has been a fair share of publicity about the SB-800 amendments to the Civil Code (Civil Code section 896, et seq.) that codified construction defect litigation in 2002. Most of the publicity is geared toward the pre-litigation standards allowing a builder the right to repair before litigation is commenced by a homeowner. Less focus and attention has been given to the fact that violation of the SB-800 performance standards is being used by plaintiff’s counsel as an additional tool in the plaintiff’s pleading tool box against builders. Closer scrutiny to SB-800 reveals that those provisions should in fact act as a limitation to the pleading tools available to plaintiffs and an additional tool for builders in the defense of cases governed by SB-800.
The typical construction defect complaint contains the boiler plate versions of numerous causes of action. These causes of action include Strict Liability, Negligence, Negligence Per Se, Breach of Contract, Breach of Contract – Third-Party Beneficiary, Breach of Express Warranties, Breach of Implied Warranties, among others. The wide array of causes of action leave a defendant “pinned to the wall” because they require a complex defense on a multitude of contract and tort related causes of action. Furthermore, the statutes of limitations as to these claims widely differ depending upon if the particular defect is considered latent or patent. The truth of the matter remains, no matter what the circumstances, if a construction defect matter ultimately goes to trial, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will obtain a judgment on at least one of these causes of action.
On its own, the Strict Liability cause of action can be a thorn in a defendant’s side. A builder is obviously placing a product into the stream of commerce and strict liability is a tough standard to defend against, particularly when it concerns intricate homes comprised of multiple components that originally sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars. A Negligence cause of action can also be difficult to defend because the duty of care for a builder is what a “reasonable” builder would have done under the circumstances. An interpretation of this duty of care can easily sway a jury that will almost always consist of sympathetic homeowners. A Negligence Per Se cause of action can also leave a defendant vulnerable to accusations that a builder violated the Uniform Building Code or a multitude of other obscure municipal construction-related code provisions during the construction of the home. Lastly, the Breach of Contract cause of action leaves a builder relying on dense and intricate purchase and sale agreements with dozens of addenda which leave the skeptical jurors turned off by what they view as one-side, boilerplate provisions. Ultimately, when a matter is about to go to trial, the complexity of these complaints can benefit a plaintiff and increase a plaintiff’s bargaining power against a defendant who is attempting to avoid a potentially large judgment.
Enter the SB-800 statutes. The SB-800 statutes apply to all homes sold after January 1, 2003. Civil Code section 938 specifically states that “[t]his title applies only to new residential units where the purchase agreements with the buyer was signed by the seller on or after January 1, 2003.” (Civil Code §, 938.) As time progresses, more residential construction defect cases will exclusively fall under the purview of SB-800. Slowly but surely more SB-800 governed litigation is being filed, and its exclusive application is looming on the horizon.
On its surface, this “right to repair” regime has left builders with a lot to be desired despite the fact that it is supposed to allow the builder the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in their product before litigation can be filed by potential plaintiffs. However, the application of the time line for repair has shown to be impractical for anything but the most minor problems involving only small numbers of residential units. Moreover, the fact that the fruits of the builder’s investigation into the claimed defects in the pre-litigation context can freely be used as evidence against it in litigation makes builders proceed with trepidation in responding with a repair. For these reasons, more SB-800 litigation can be expected to result due to the shortcomings of the pre-litigation procedures, and savvy defense counsel should anticipate the issues to be dealt with in presenting the defense of such cases at trial.
This fact should not necessarily be met with fear or disdain. Within the SB-800 statutes, the legislature made it clear that they were creating a new cause of action for construction defect claims, but it further made it clear that this cause of action is a plaintiff’s exclusive remedy. The legislature giveth, but at the same time, the legislature taketh away. Throughout numerous provisions within the SB-800 statutes, the Civil Code states that claims for construction defects as to residential construction are exclusively governed by the Civil Code, and that the Civil Code governs any and all litigation arising under breaches of these provisions. Civil Code section 896 specifically states:
In any action seeking recovery of damages arising out of, or related to deficiencies in, the residential construction … the claimant’s claims or causes of action shall be limited to violation of, the following standards, except as specifically set forth in this title. (Civil Code §, 896.)
Civil Code section 896 then provides approximately fifty-plus standards by which a construction defect claim is assessed under that provision. Civil Code section 896 covers everything from plumbing to windows, and from foundations to decks, and in several instances expressly dictates statutes of limitations as to specific areas of construction that severely truncate the 10-year latent damage limitations period. As for any construction deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 explicitly defines the intent of the standards and provides a method to assess deficiencies that are not addressed in Civil Code section 896. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civil Code §, 897.)
Therefore, Civil Code section 897 acts as a catch-all by which defects that are not covered within Civil Code section 896 can be evaluated on a damage standard mirroring the Aas case (damages must be present and actual). The result of sections 896 and 897 being read in combination is a comprehensive, all-inclusive set of performance standards by which any defect raised by Plaintiffs can be evaluated and resolved under a single SB-800 based cause of action.
Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Specifically, Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. In addition to the rights under this title, this title does not apply to any action by a claimant to enforce a contract or express contractual provision, or any action for fraud, personal injury, or violation of a statute. (Civil Code §, 943.)
Civil Code section 944 provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, [and] the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts… . (Civil Code §, 944.)
A cursory review of these statutes yields the conclusion that the legislature was attempting to create an exclusive cause of action that trumps all other causes of action where SB-800 applies. The remedy available to plaintiffs is limited to that allowed by the Civil Code. As noted above, “[n]o other cause of action for a claim covered by this title…is allowed.” (Civil Code §, 943.) Therefore, Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944 specifically prohibit the contract-based and tort-based causes of action typically pled by plaintiffs.
Plaintiff’s counsel has seized upon the language of section 943 to advance the argument that SB-800 still allows a plaintiff to advance typical contract and tort based causes of action. On the surface, this argument may seem compelling, but a minimum of scrutiny of the express language of section 943 dispels this notion. Section 943 says that it provides rights “[i]n addition” to those under the SB-800 Civil Code provisions. Clearly, the language in section 943 is intended to expressly underscore the fact that a plaintiff is not precluded from seeking relief in addition to that allowed under SB-800 for damages not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards or for damages in addition to those recoverable under Section 944. This language does not provide an unfettered license to bring a Strict Liability, Negligence or other cause of action against a builder where SB-800 applies.
In fact, this language only keeps the door open for plaintiffs to pursue such causes of action not arising from a breach of the SB-800 standards should there be such supporting allegations. For example, if a plaintiff alleges that a builder breached an “express contractual provision” related to the timing of the completion of the home and close of escrow, and the contract specifies damages in this regard, a plaintiff may have a viable separate cause of action for Breach of Contract for recovery of those damages precisely because that is not an issue expressly dealt with in SB-800 in the performance standards under sections 896 and 897, or in the damage recovery terms under 944. As it stands, the vast majority of complaints are seeking redress for violation of the same primary right; that is, defects specifically outlined in Section 896 and 897 or which result in damages as stated in Section 944.
So, how does a builder defend against a complaint that contains multiple causes of action regarding construction defects for a home sold after January 1, 2003? There are numerous ways to approach this. First and foremost, these superfluous and improper causes of action can be attacked by demurrer seeking dismissal of all causes of action other than the cause of action alleging violation of SB-800. If the the time period within which to file a demurrer has passed already, a motion for judgment on the pleadings can be utilized to attack the improper causes of action in the same way as a demurrer can be used for this purpose.
The limitation to a demurrer or motion for judgment on the pleadings is that the judge is restricted to viewing only the four corners of the pleading when making a ruling. It is typical for plaintiffs’ counsel to cleverly (or one might even say, disingenuously) leave the complaint purposely vague to avoid a successful defense attack on the pleadings by not including the original date the residence was sold. In that instance, a motion for summary adjudication can be used to attack a plaintiff’s complaint. By simply providing evidence that the homes were originally sold after January 1, 2003, the improper causes of action should be subject to dismissal by summary adjudication. If the plaintiff is a subsequent purchaser, the builder still has recourse to enforce the pleading limitations under SB-800. Civil Code section 945 states that “[t]he provisions, standards, rights, and obligations set forth in this title are binding upon all original purchasers and their successors-in-interest.” (Civil Code §, 945.)
Attacking a plaintiff’s complaint to eliminate multiple causes of action can have numerous benefits. The practical result is that a plaintiff will only have one viable cause of action. The advantage is that the SB-800 performance standards include the defined performance standards and shortened statutes of limitations periods with regard to specific issues. Furthermore, as to defects which are not specifically provided for in Civil Code section 896, Civil Code section 897 requires a proof of actual damages. Therefore, a plaintiff must provide evidence of current damages and not simply conditions that may potentially cause damage in the future.
The Appellate Courts have yet to directly address and interpret these SB-800 provisions. The time for that is undoubtedly drawing near. For now, however, plaintiffs will have to find ways to accurately plead construction defect claims within the confines of one cause of action for breach of the performance standards enumerated within the Civil Code.
Printed courtesy of Lorber, Greenfield & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com and Mr. Verbick at tverbick@lorberlaw.com.
Injured Construction Worker Settles for Five Hundred Thousand
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
An upstate New York man who was injured when an unsecured truss fell off the railings of a scissor lift has settled for $500,000. As the accident happened at the building site for a casino for the Seneca Nation, attorneys for the construction firm had argued that New York labor laws were inapplicable as the injury happened on Seneca Nation land. The state appeals court ruled that as none of the parties involved were Native Americans, it was not internal to the affairs of the Seneca Nation.
Read the full story...
Lien Claimant’s Right to Execute against Bond Upheld in Court of Appeals
February 10, 2012 — Douglas Rieser, Builders Counsel
Stonewood v. Infinity Homes is a simple construction dispute over a matter of about $9,000.00. But sometimes these tiny little disputes turn into expensive legal battles over mere procedural quivering. In Stonewood, a small subcontractor won a big victory yesterday when the Divison 1 Court of Appeals upheld its judgment against a lien release bond posted by an owner.
Infinity Homes contracted with Stonewood Design to lay tile in one of its customer’s homes. Stonewood did the work, but Infinity withheld roughly $9,000.00 of the contract sums for what it alleged were trade damages left on the tile. The two parties were unable to come to an agreement over payment and Stonewood proceeded with a lien under RCW 60.04. It then filed an action to enforce the lien against the homeowner, Infinity and its bonding company.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com