Tampa Condo Owners Allege Defects
October 23, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Owners in the Bel Mare towers have filed a lawsuit alleging that the building have construction defects that could lead to problems during periods with high winds. The Tampa Bay Business Journal reports that the condo association has sued the developer, the general contractor, the architects, the structural engineers, and subcontractors.
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Quarter Four a Good One for Luxury Homebuilder
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Toll Brothers has announced that their fourth-quarter net income is $2.35 per share, which they attribute in part to an income tax benefit. Their revenue, at $632.8 million, easily exceeded analysts’ projections of $565.1 million. Additionally, their number of signed contracts jumped seventy percent while their cancellation rate dropped nearly half to 4.9 percent.
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Green Buildings Could Lead to Liabilities
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Attempts to build “green,” reducing energy costs and increasing the use of sustainable building materials, may lead to more lawsuits, according to a report issued by the British Columbia Construction Association. The report warned those who were going to build green look into the implications. The report looked at the result of green building practices and requirements adopted in the United States.
The report warns that “the use of novel, less harmful building material or new construction techniques may give rise to liability due to: contractor inexperience with installation; lack of long-term evaluation of green materials; lack of understanding of how new building materials may impact existing traditional building systems; or warranties provided unintentionally about the durability or effectiveness of unproven materials or techniques.”
Manley McLachlan, president of the BCAA noted that they are aware of “legal action around the performance of the buildings,” noting that while fast-growing trees help toward LEED certification, their wood is more prone to mold. He also felt that low-VOC paints needed more testing to prove their durability as exterior finishes.
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Ghost Employees Steal Jobs from Legit Construction Firms
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Firms that skirt labor laws for construction workers can undercut firms that are obeying those laws. In a piece in Raleigh, North Carolina’s News & Observer, Doug Burton, a commercial masonry contractor summed it up: “my competitors are cheating.” The article describes the low-bidding firms “called their workers independent contractors ? or treated them like ghosts, paid under the table and never acknowledged.” The cost to the state is “unpaid medical bills for injured workers, uncollected business and personal taxes, and payments not made to a depleted state unemployment reserve.”
One firm examined in the article, Martin’s Bricklaying, employs mostly immigrant Mexican laborers, many of whom are in the country illegally. One employee told the News & Observer, “we don’t complain.”
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Hovnanian Increases Construction Defect Reserves for 2012
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In their fourth quarter earnings call, executives of Hovnanian Enterprises made some projections for investors, covering the company’s plans for 2012. During the call, Ara K. Hovnanian, the firm’s CEO, discussed their reserves to meet construction defect claims. The firm does an annual actuarial study of their construction defect reserves.
Mr. Hovnanian noted that there have been no changes for the past several years, but this year they are increasing their reserves by about $6.3 million. Additionally, the firm has added $2.5 million to their legal reserves. Mr. Hovnanian stated “we do not anticipate that changes of this magnitude will be recurring as we look forward to 2012.”
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California insured’s duty to cooperate and insurer’s right to select defense counsel
April 14, 2011 — April 14, 2011 - CDCoverage.com
In Travelers Property Casualty Co. v. Centex Homes, No. C 10-02757 (N.D. Cal. April 1, 2011), general contractor Centex was sued by homeowners for construction defects. Centex tendered its defense to Travelers as an additional insured under policies issued by Travelers to two Centex subcontractors. Travelers agreed to defend Centex under a reservation of rights and selected defense counsel to defend Centex. Centex refused to accept the defense, asserting that it was entitled to select defense counsel. Travelers filed suit against Centex seeking a declaratory judgment that Centex had breached the duty to cooperate condition in the Travelers’ policy.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Ohio Court of Appeals Affirms Judgment in Landis v. Fannin Builders
April 20, 2011 — April 20, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment in Landis v. William Fannin Builders. Landis contracted Fannin Builders to build their home. The case involved staining problems on the T1-11 siding chosen by the plaintiffs.
After a year and a half of discussion on how to resolve the problem of uneven staining on the siding, Landis filed suit “against Fannin Builders, alleging claims for breach of contract, breach of the express limited warranty, and violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (“OCSPA”). Fannin Builders, in turn, filed a third-party complaint against 84 Lumber, alleging claims for breach of contract and indemnification. With the trial court’s leave, Fannin Builders also later amended its answer to add a counterclaim against appellees for breach of contract and unjust enrichment. In the counterclaim, Fannin Builders alleged that appellees still owed it $3,908.98 for the construction of appellees’ home.”
“In its decision, the trial court found in appellees’ favor on their breach of contract claim and against appellees on their claims for breach of the express limited warranty and violation of the OCSPA. Additionally, the trial court found in Fannin Builders’ favor on its counterclaim for breach of contract and against Fannin Builders on its third-party claims for breach of contract and indemnity. The trial court determined that appellees’ damages amounted to $66,906.24, and after setting off the $3,908.98 that appellees owed Fannin Builders under the construction contract, the trial court awarded appellees $62,997.26. The trial court reduced its decision to judgment on May 18, 2010.”
Fannin Builders appealed this judgment and assigned the following errors:
[1.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant Breached its Contract with Appellees when it provided a Semi-Transparent Oil-Based Stain that Simply did not Meet their Approval.
[a.] The Contract does not Contain a Satisfaction Clause.
[b.] Even if the Court Implies a Satisfaction Clause, the Court Should Apply an Objective Standard.
[2.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Failing to Consider Appellant’s Right to Cure.
[3.] The Trial Court committed Reversible Error by not Assessing Damages Using “Diminished Value Standard,” and by Creating a Remedy that Constitutes Economic Waste.
[4.] The Trial Court Erred as a Matter of Law by Concluding that Appellant is Barred from Seeking Indemnification When 84 [Lumber] Never Fulfilled its Obligations Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement Entered on August 2, 2005.
In response to the first assigned error, the Court of Appeals stated: “Because the failure to provide siding of a uniform color, not appellees’ displeasure, breached the contract, we reject Fannin Builders’ contention that the trial court implied a satisfaction clause into the contract and found a breach of that clause. Accordingly, we overrule Fannin Builders’ first assignment of error.”
The Court of Appeals overruled the second assignment of error and provided the following reasoning: “Although Fannin Builders depends upon a term of the limited warranty for its right to cure, the trial court concluded that no breach of the limited warranty occurred. Fannin Builders breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIA’s Quality Standards. Consequently, the limited warranty does not apply to this case, and thus, it does not prevent appellees’ recovery of damages.”
The Appeals Court found “the trial court’s award of damages” was “both reasonable and supported by competent, credible evidence,” and therefore concluded “that the trial court did not err in setting appellees’ damages at $62,997.26.” The Fannin Builders third assignment of error was overruled.
The fourth and final assignment of error was also overruled by the Court of Appeals. “While Fannin Builders correctly asserts that 84 Lumber never installed the replacement siding, it ignores the fact that it ordered 84 Lumber to remove the replacement siding from appellees’ property. Thus, Fannin Builders precluded 84 Lumber from completely performing under the August 2, 2005 letter agreement. […] Consequently, Fannin Builders cannot now claim that the letter agreement is unenforceable or that it is entitled to indemnification from 84 Lumber. Because Fannin Builders assumed all liability for the defective siding in the letter agreement, it is responsible for appellees’ damages.”
James A. Zitesman, Columbus, Ohio Business Attorney, compared the case to Jones v. Centex (Ohio App. 2010), which had a different verdict:
“The common thread is the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the Jones case, the Court found that the buyers had in fact waived all implied warranties, including the implied warranty of good workmanship. In the contract between Jones and Centex, the builder stated that it “…would not sell the property to Purchasers without this waiver.” Probably should have been a sign to the buyers.
In the Landis case, the Court stated, “Contracts for the future construction of a residence include a duty, implied by law, that the builder must perform its work in a workmanlike manner.” The Court gave significant weight to the concept of the implied warranty of good workmanship. The builder relied upon the BIA Warranty which limits builders’ liability and exposure to legal issues. The trial court concluded there was no breach of the limited warranty, rather the builder “breached the duty of workmanlike conduct implicit in the construction contract, not the limited warranty requiring it to satisfy the BIAs Quality Standards.”
The Supreme Court of Ohio has accepted the Jones v. Centex Homes case for review.
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Texas Construction Firm Files for Bankruptcy
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A Texas construction firm, founded in 1937, filed for bankruptcy, bringing twenty-two projects to a sudden halt, and resulting in the loss of jobs for hundreds of employees. Ballenger Construction told its employees to go home, as it could not complete the jobs. In some cases, work will need to be done to ensure that the work sites do not cause public safety hazards.
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Construction Defect Journal Seeks Article Submissions Regarding SB800 and Other Builders Right to Repair Laws
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
As we approach the tenth anniversary of the passage and signing of SB800, California’s right-to-repair law, we’d like to hear your reactions to the law, your experiences with it, and your thoughts on it and right-to-repair laws in other states.
We invite you to submit articles either reacting to SB800 or on other matters relevant to construction defect and claims issues. You can promote your firm’s capabilities and get valuable exposure through the publication of your articles. Construction Defect Journal is widely read by our highly targeted audience of decision makers, construction attorneys, builders, owners, and claims professionals.
Articles may contain relevant images, your firm’s name, and links to your corporate website or third parties and can be submitted through e-mail to submitstory@constructiondefectjournal.com. Please remember to include your contact information if you would like it to be published with your content. If you are submitting photos or PDF documents with your article, please send them as e-mail attachments. Items submitted are assumed to be cleared for publishing upon receipt by CDJ.
Normally articles are published in full, although we reserve the right to edit content for space purposes. All articles submitted are considered for publication. For additional questions please contact editor@constructiondefectjournal.com.
Arizona Court of Appeals Decision in $8.475 Million Construction Defect Class Action Suit
May 9, 2011 — May 9, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
In the case of Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011), which involved an $8.475 million settlement in a construction defect class action suit, the question put forth to the Appeals court was “whether an insured and an insurer can join in a Morris agreement that avoids the primary insurer’s obligation to pay policy limits and passes liability in excess of those limits on to other insurers.” The Appeals court provided several reasons for their decision to affirm the validity of the settlement agreement as to the Non-Participatory Insurers (NPIs) and to vacate and remand the attorney fee awards.
First, the Appeals court stated, “The settlement agreement is not a compliant Morris agreement and provides no basis for claims against the NPIs.” They conclude, “Appellants attempt to avoid the doctrinal underpinnings of Morris by arguing that ‘the cooperation clause did not prohibit Hancock from assigning its rights to anyone, including Appellants.’ This narrow reading of the cooperation clause ignores the fact that Hancock did not merely assign its rights — it assigned its rights after stipulating to an $8.475 million judgment that neither it nor its Direct Insurers could ever be liable to pay. Neither Morris nor any other case defines such conduct as actual ‘cooperation’—rather, Morris simply defines limited circumstances in which an insured is relieved of its duty to cooperate. Because Morris agreements are fraught with risk of abuse, a settlement that mimics Morris in form but does not find support in the legal and economic realities that gave rise to that decision is both unenforceable and offensive to the policy’s cooperation clause.”
The Appeals court further concluded that “even if the agreement had qualified under Morris, plaintiffs did not provide the required notice to the NPIs.” The court continued, “Because an insurer who defends under a reservation of rights is always aware of the possibility of a Morris agreement, the mere threat of Morris in the course of settlement negotiations does not constitute sufficient notice. Instead, the insurer must be made aware that it may waive its reservation of rights and provide an unqualified defense, or defend solely on coverage and reasonableness grounds against the judgment resulting from the Morris agreement. The NPIs were not given the protections of this choice before the agreement was entered, and therefore can face no liability for the resulting stipulated judgment.”
Next, the Appeals court declared that “the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under A.R.S § 12-341.” The Appeals court reasoned, “In this case, the NPIs prevailed in their attack on the settlement. But the litigation did not test the merits of their coverage defenses or the reasonableness of the settlement amount. And Plaintiffs never sued the NPIs, either in their own right or as the assignees of Hancock. Rather, the NPIs intervened to test the conceptual validity of the settlement agreement (to which they were not parties) before such an action could commence. In these circumstances, though it might be appropriate to offset a fee award against some future recovery by the Plaintiff Leflet v. Fire (Ariz. App., 2011) class, the purposes of A.R.S. § 12-341.01 would not be served by an award of fees against them jointly and severally. We therefore conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding fees against Plaintiffs ‘jointly and severally.’”
The Appeals court made the following conclusion: “we affirm the judgment of the trial court concerning the validity of the settlement agreement as to the NPIs. We vacate and remand the award of attorney’s fees. In our discretion, we decline to award the NPIs the attorney’s fees they have requested on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A).”
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Lien Claimant’s Right to Execute against Bond Upheld in Court of Appeals
February 10, 2012 — Douglas Rieser, Builders Counsel
Stonewood v. Infinity Homes is a simple construction dispute over a matter of about $9,000.00. But sometimes these tiny little disputes turn into expensive legal battles over mere procedural quivering. In Stonewood, a small subcontractor won a big victory yesterday when the Divison 1 Court of Appeals upheld its judgment against a lien release bond posted by an owner.
Infinity Homes contracted with Stonewood Design to lay tile in one of its customer’s homes. Stonewood did the work, but Infinity withheld roughly $9,000.00 of the contract sums for what it alleged were trade damages left on the tile. The two parties were unable to come to an agreement over payment and Stonewood proceeded with a lien under RCW 60.04. It then filed an action to enforce the lien against the homeowner, Infinity and its bonding company.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
North Carolina Exclusion j(6) “That Particular Part”
February 10, 2012 — CDCoverage.com
In Alliance Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dove, 714 S.E.2d 782 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), claimant Murphy-Brown hired insured Dove to repair a broken elevator belt in a grain elevator in Murphy-Brown’s feed mill. The elevator was inside a metal duct and, to access the broken belt, Dove had to cut out a section of the duct. After replacing the belt, Dove welded the metal section back to the duct. Immediately after Dove completed the welding, dust inside the duct ignited, causing an explosion in the elevator, resulting in property damage to the elevator and other property. Murphy-Brown sued Dove for negligence seeking damages for the repair and replacement of the elevator, repair and replacement of the other property, increased grain handling costs during the repairs, and loss of use.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Condo Owners Worried Despite Settlement
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
KB Homes may have settled a construction defect claim with Willowbrook Condominium Association, but some of the owners are still concerned about the repair process. The Sarasota, Florida Herald Tribune reports that one homeowner’s living room “ends with a white tarp.” He told the paper, “We feel like we’re not even owners of our own home.” A neighbor wondered “what happens when people get displaced while their homes are gutted?”
As part of the agreement, the condominium association will be selecting a contractor to repair the problems, while the cost will be paid by KB Homes. Nevertheless, at least one owner fears for their ability to resell his home, noting that even after repairs have been made, “do you think someone’s going to come in here and buy?”
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Battle of “Other Insurance” Clauses
March 23, 2011 —
Tred R. Eyerly -
Insurance Law Hawaii - March 23, 2011
The New York Court of Appeals considered the impact of competing “other insurance” provisions located in both a CGL policy and a D&O policy. See Fieldston Property Owners Assoc., Inc. v. Hermitage Ins. Co., Inv., 2011 N.Y. LEXIS 254 (N.Y. Feb. 24, 2011).
In the underlying case, Fieldston’s officers were charged with making false statements and fraudulent claims with respect to a customer's right to access its property from adjacent streets. Suit was eventually filed against Fieldston and its officers, alleging several causes of action including injurious falsehood. Damages were sought.
Fieldston’s CGL policy was issued by Hermitage. The “other insurance” provision stated, “If other valid and collectible insurance is available to the insured for a loss we cover . . . our obligations are limited,” but also stated it would share with all other insurance as a primary policy.
Read the full story...Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Florida Contractor on Trial for Bribing School Official
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
Lloyd Whann, an executive in M. M. Parrish Construction, a Gainesville, Florida firm, is going to trial over claims that he bribed a school district official with more than $50,000 in gifts. The trial has been pushed to March of 2012, in order for his defense to review documents.
Bob Williams, the former school official, plead guilty to conspiracy to commit bribery. He agreed to testify against Whann and M.M. Parrish Construction.
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Texas contractual liability exclusion
May 18, 2011 — May 18, 2011 - CDCoverage.com
In Ewing Construction Co., Inc. v. Amerisure Ins. Co., No. C-10-256 (S.D. Tex. April 28, 2011), insured Ewing was the general contractor for an athletic facility constructed for a school district. The school district sued Ewing alleging defective construction of the project. The underlying complaint included contract and negligence causes of action, and sought damages for the repair of the damages and loss of the use of the project. The complaint did not allege damage to any property other than the project itself. Ewing tendered its defense to its CGL insurer Amerisure. Amerisure denied a defense and Ewing filed suit against Amerisure. The federal district trial court entered summary judgment for Amerisure. Applying Texas law, the court held that all of the damages fell within the “contractual liability†exclusion precluding any duty to defend or indemnify.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Construction Defect Destroys Home, Forty Years Later
June 19, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Fire investigators in Monroe, North Carolina have blamed a nail as the source of a fire that lead to a home being declared a total loss. The nail, part of the original construction, nicked a wire within a wall, causing a short, which started a fire. The home was built in the late 1960s.
WBTV reported that the homeowner was awakened by a power outage. He went outside and saw flames coming from a vent in the roof. He was unable to contain the fire with a garden hose. Neighbors called firemen who were able to stop the blaze.
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Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
Read the court’s decision…