Will They Blow It Up?
March 28, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The issues concerning the Harmon Towers building in Las Vegas continue to make their way through the courts. As we noted in a previous piece, Cook County building officials stated that the building could be a hazard if Las Vegas were struck by an earthquake. The question of whether the building will continue to stand is just one of the issues in front of a judge.
MGM Resorts International argued at a March 13 hearing for permission to implode the Harmon hotel building. They claim that more than 1,700 defects have been discovered in the building and that the building is a public safety hazard. Arguing against demolition, Perini Building Company, the general contractor for the hotel, and its subcontractors are claiming that imploding the building would destroy evidence and prejudice juries in the ongoing construction defect claims. They claim that MGM Resorts wishes to abandon the building due to the economic slowdown. Perini Corp, the contractor for the project, claims that the building can be fixed. Perini claims that MGM’s position in the construction trial would be improved if the building is demolished.
After Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez heard the four days of testimony on the Harmon Towers building and whether it should be demolished, she scheduled more testimony, with two days in April and an entire week in July. Judge Gonzalez will be deciding whether the building will be torn down, imploded, or left in place.
Read the full story…
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Damron Agreement Questioned in Colorado Casualty Insurance v Safety Control Company, et al.
February 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment in Colorado Casualty Insurance Company versus Safety Control Company, Inc., et al. (Ariz. App., 2012). The Superior Court in Maricopa County addressed “the validity and effect of a Damron agreement a contractor and its excess insurer entered into that assigned their rights to sue the primary insurer.” Judge Johnsen stated, “We hold the agreement is enforceable but remand for a determination of whether the stipulated judgment falls within the primary insurer’s policy.”
The Opinion provides some facts and procedural history regarding the claim. “The Arizona Department of Transportation (“ADOT”) hired DBA Construction Company (“DBA”) to perform a road-improvement project on the Loop 101 freeway. Safety Control Company, Inc. was one of DBA’s subcontractors. As required by the subcontract, Safety Control purchased from Employer’s Mutual Casualty Company (“EMC”) a certificate of insurance identifying DBA as an additional insured on a policy providing primary coverage for liability arising out of Safety Control’s work.”
A collision occurred on site, injuring Hugo Roman. Roman then sued ADT and DBA for damages. “Colorado Casualty tendered DBA’s defense to the subcontractors, including Safety Control. Safety Control and EMC rejected the tender. Roman eventually settled his claims against DBA and ADOT. DBA and ADOT stipulated with Roman for entry of judgment of $750,000; Roman received $75,000 from DBA (paid by Colorado Casualty) and $20,000 from ADOT, and agreed not to execute on the stipulated judgment. Finally, DBA, ADOT and Colorado Casualty assigned to Roman their rights against the subcontractors and other insurers.”
Colorado Casualty attempted to recover what “it had paid to defend DBA and ADOT and settle with Roman. However, Roman intervened, and argued that “Colorado Casualty had assigned its subrogation rights to him as part of the settlement agreement.” The suit was not dismissed, but the Superior Court allowed Roman to intervene. “Roman then filed a counterclaim against Colorado Casualty and a cross-claim against the subcontractors.”
All claims were settled against all of the defendants except Safety Control and EMC. “The superior court ruled on summary judgment that EMC breached a duty to defend DBA and that as a result, ‘DBA was entitled to settle with Roman without EMC’s consent as long as the settlement was not collusive or fraudulent.’ After more briefing, the court held the stipulated judgment was neither collusive nor procured by fraud and that EMC therefore was liable to Roman on the stipulated judgment and for his attorney’s fees. The court also held Safety Control breached its subcontract with DBA by failing to procure completed-operations insurance coverage and would be liable for damages to the extent that EMC did not satisfy what remained (after the other settlements) of the stipulated judgment and awards of attorney’s fees.” Safety Control and EMC appealed the judgment.
Four reasons were given for the decision of the ruling. First, “the disagreement between Roman and Colorado Casualty does not preclude them from pursuing their claims against EMC and Safety Control.” Second, “the settlement agreement is not otherwise invalid.” Third, “issues of fact remain about whether the judgment falls within the EMC policy.” Finally, “Safety Control breached the subcontract by failing to procure ‘Completed Operations’ coverage for DBA.”
In conclusion, the Superior Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded . “Although, as stated above, we have affirmed several rulings of the superior court, we reverse the judgment against EMC and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion to determine whether the stipulated judgment was a liability that arose out of Safety Control’s operations. In addition, we affirm the superior court’s declaratory judgment against Safety Control but remand so that the court may clarify the circumstances under which Safety Control may be liable for damages and may conduct whatever further proceedings it deems appropriate to ascertain the amount of those damages. We decline all parties’ requests for attorney’s fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01 without prejudice to a request for fees incurred in this appeal to be filed by the prevailing party on remand before the superior court.”
Read the court’s decision…
Homeowner Loses Suit against Architect and Contractor of Resold Home
June 14, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals in the case of Kizor v. Architects ruled that Mr. Kizor could not make construction defect claims against the architect and contractor of his home, as the defects had caused significant damage to the former owners, and it was they, not Kizor, who could have asserted those claims.
The background of the case was that John and Miranda Redig hired BRU Architects to design a home. During construction in 2000, they wrote to the roofing supplier complaining about leaks. The leaks were caulked, but the roof continued leaking during rains. The Redigs sold their house to Kizor in 2002, with an addendum to the sale contract protecting themselves from liability for further problems with the roof. “Seller has no responsibility for the condition of the roof and stucco and buyer absolves seller of any liability in connection therewith.”
In 2006, Kizor sued the architects, contractor, and subcontractor. The defendants moved for summary judgment which was granted. Kizor appealed, and in this current court case, appeal was denied.
Read the court’s decision
A Downside of Associational Standing - HOA's Claims Against Subcontractors Barred by Statute of Limitations
March 28, 2012 — Bret Cogdill, Colorado Construction Litigation
In multi-family construction defect litigation in Colorado, homeowners associations rely on associational standing to pursue claims affecting more than two units and to bring claims covering an entire development. This practice broadens an association’s case beyond what individual, aggrieved owners would otherwise bring on their own against a developer or builder-vendor. However, reliance on associational standing to combine homeowners’ defect claims into a single lawsuit has its drawbacks to homeowners.
A recent order in the case Villa Mirage Condominium Owners’ Association, Inc., v. Stetson 162, LLC, et al., in El Paso County District Court, presents an example. There, the HOA unsuccessfully sought a determination from the court that its claims against subcontractors were not barred by the statute of limitations. To do so, the HOAs attempted to apply the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act (“CCIOA”), which governs the creation and operation of HOAs, and a statute intended to apply to persons under a legal disability.
Under CCIOA, during the period of “declarant control” the developer may appoint members to the association’s executive board until sufficient homeowners have moved into the development and taken seats on the board.
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Reprinted courtesy of Bret Cogdill of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Cogdill can be contacted at cogdill@hhmrlaw.com.
Lawsuit over Construction Defects Not a Federal Case
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The United State District Court in California has dismissed the claims of a contractor against the United States government, on the grounds that it was not within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. The origins of the case are in a related construction defect claim. The current plaintiff, Performance Contracting, Inc., did the lath and plaster work for a building for the Department of Veterans Affairs. After the building was completed, the Veterans Affairs complained to the general contractor, Wynema, Inc., of water intrusion problems.
Wyema and Performance conducted testing and the water intrusion was found to be due to “a variety of design defects and omissions, including: 1) omission of proper window flashing; 2) inadequate waterproof membrane around the windows; 3) inadequate T-molding around the windows; 4) lack of a window sill pan for the windows; 5) lack of any backing in the window framing; 6) lack of any backing for the stucco expansion joints and seams; and 7) failure to require that a performance mock-up of the window assembly and adjacent areas be built and water tested.” Wyema filed a construction defect action against Performance and other subcontractors.
In the current case, Performance claims that Veteran Affairs was negligent, that it “breached its duty to Plaintiff when it provided deficient plants and specifications” and “failed to properly oversee construction and inspect Project work.” The court determined that it could not hear this case, noting that “Federal Courts are presumptively without jurisdiction over civil actions.”
Performance raised its claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The judge was not persuaded by this claim, noting that the FTCA does not apply to purported breach of the General Contract. The FTCA waives the government’s sovereign immunity in cases of “injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of an employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.”
Performance was unable to pursue its claims in the Court of Federal Claims as there was no contract between Performance and the government. However, the court noted that Performance’s inability to file suit in the Court of Federal Claims does not open up a path to the District Court. “Litigants are not guaranteed a forum in which to sue the United States.” The court further noted that “if this Court were to accept Plaintiff’s logic, non-parties to contracts, but not parties, would be free to pursue contract claims in the fora of their choosing.”
Read the court’s decision…
Judge Okays Harmon Tower Demolition, Also Calls for More Testing
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Vegas.Inc reports that Clark County District Court Judge Elizabeth Gonzalez has permitted the demolition the tower, which MGM Resorts has claimed is a safety hazard. Perini Building Co. claims that the building does not need to be demolished. CityCenter claims that repairing the building would take nearly a year longer than a demolition and cost about $200 million. Further, CityCenter assumes that the building’s reputation would cost it another $30 million.
Subsequently, Judge Gonzalez ruled that the pattern of destructive testing would not support a claim that there were an estimated 1,400 defective items in the building. An attorney for CityCenter, Steve Morris, has suggested that they may seek more testing, impossible to do once the building is demolished. CityCenter issued a statement that “nearly every time CityCenter has chipped away concrete to review structural work at the Harmon, we have found defects.” They describe the building as “unusable.”
Tutor Perini contends that it “remains confident that it will prevail when the issues of safety, reparability and responsibility for the issues facing the Harmon tower are considered.
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Building Boom Leads to Construction Defect Cases
August 2, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Professor Evan McKenzie of the University of Illinois at Chicago says that rise of construction defect litigation in the Las Vegas area followed the same pattern it did in other places, according to an article in the Las Vegas Review Journal. “Step one,” according to Professor McKenzie, “there was this enormous growth in construction. Then these attorneys began to swarm in from all over, especially Southern California.” McKenzie noted that during a building boom, construction “outpaces the ability of building inspectors to do their job.”
But, despite his contention that “rapid growth in housing stock” leads to “shoddy construction,” another problem of growth was that “eventually there were too many lawyers chasing too many condominium complexes and subdivisions.” What came next was that “attorneys start coming up with cases that really aren’t good cases.” It’s in the interest of these attorneys that HOA boards sue.
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New Construction Laws, New Forms in California
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
New construction laws came into effect in California on July 1. Writing for the Martindale-Hubble Legal Library, Glenn Mau, J. Michael McGuire, and John Tonsing, all of Archer Norris, discuss these changes. They note that the most important part of the changes to California construction law is that “all mechanics liens, stop notices and bond claims recorded after July 1, 2012 must use the new standardized forms and follow the new definitions, notice prerequisites and statutory release form language.”
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Texas Windstorm Insurance Agency Under Scrutiny
April 5, 2011 — April 5, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Representative Larry Taylor has introduced a bill in the Texas Legislature (HB 2818) that would further regulate the Texas Windstorm Insurance Agency (TWIA). According to Taylor, “In order to be adequately prepared for future hurricane seasons, it is imperative that TWIA be operating at maximum efficiency, that the Reserve Trust Fund be solvent and that the agency have adequate management measures in place to protect consumers and ensure that claims are paid in a timely manner. House Bill 2818 is an important step in the right direction toward restoring public confidence in TWIA.”
HB 2818 includes measures that would create an expert panel that would advise the commissioner on how to evaluate loss from the storm, and a greater transparency of TWIA Board meetings and actions.
In addition, the Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) has placed TWIA on Administrative Oversight. According to TDI, “While under Administrative Oversight, the Department may require its prior review and approval of executive decisions, certain expenditures, and other transactions. The insurer is required to fully cooperate with the Department and provide complete and timely disclosure of all information responsive to Department requests.”
Read the full story (Rep. Taylor’s Press Release)...
Read the full story (Texas Department of Insurance’s Press Release)...
California Appeals Court Remands Fine in Late Completion Case
November 18, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals in Stanislaus County has reversed the decision of the lower court in Greg Opinski Construction Inc. v. City of Oakdale. The earlier court had awarded the city of judgment of $54,000 for late completion, $3,266 for repair of construction defects and interest, and $97,775 in attorneys’ fees. The late completion of the project was due to actions by the City of Oakdale, however, the court rejected Opinski’s argument that the California Supreme Court decision in Kiewit did not allow this, as his contract with the city established a procedure for claiming extensions.
The appeals court noted that the Kiewit decision has been “criticized as an unwarranted interference in the power of contracting parties to shift the risk of delays caused by one party onto the other party by forcing the second party to give the first notice of any intention to claim an extension of time based on delays caused by first.” They cited Sweet, a professor at Boalt Hall, UC Berkeley’s law school, that Kiewit “gutted” the “provision that conditions the contractor’s right to claim an extension of time for delays beyond his control.”
Further changes in California law in response to the Kiewit decision lead to the current situation which the court characterized as “if the contractor wished to claim it needed an extension of time because of delays caused by the city, the contractor was required to obtain a written change order by mutual consent or submit a claim in writing requesting a formal decision by the engineer.”
Opinski also argued that the lower court misinterpreted the contract. The Appeals court replied that “Opinski is mistaken.” He cited parts of the contract regarding the increase of time, but the court rejected these, noting that “an inability to agree is not the same as an express rejection.”
The court also rejects Opinski’s appeal that “the evidence the project was complete earlier than September 30, 2005, is weightier than the evidence to the contrary,” which they describe as “not a winning appellate argument.” The court points out that the role of an appeals court is not to reweigh the evidence, but to determine “whether the record contains substantial evidence in support of the judgment.”
The court did side with Opinski on one question of the escrow account. They rejected most of his arguments, repeating the line “Opinski is mistaken” several times. They decided that he was mistaken on the timing of the setoff decision and on whether the city was the prevailing party. However, the appeals court did find that Opinski was not liable for interest on the judgment.
The appeals court rejected the awarding of prejudgment interest to the city as the funds from which the judgment was drawn was held in an escrow account. The court noted that the city had access to the funds and could “access the funds when it determined that Opinski had breached the contract.” The appeals court noted that the judgment exhausted the escrow balance and remanded the case to the lower court to determine the amount own to Opinski.
Read the court’s decision…
Remodels Replace Construction in Redding
September 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The Record Searchlight reports that while new construction is down in Redding, California, residential and commercial remodel permits are up 17 percent. By August 2010, there had been 63 housing and commercial business starts in Redding, while this year has seen only 15.
One such remodel, that of Parkview Market, will cost about $201,000. Safeway is planning on two $80,000 remodels of its grocery stores in Redding. In all, the 150 building permits for remodels are worth a total of $2.8 million.
Read the full story…
Alabama “occurrence” and subcontractor work exception to the “your completed work” exclusion
November 18, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
In Town & Country Property, LLC v. Amerisure Ins. Co., No. 1100009 (Ala. Oct. 21, 2010), property owner Town & Country contracted with insured general contractor Jones-Williams for the construction of a car dealership. All of the construction work was performed by Jones-Williams subcontractors. After completion, Town & Country sued Jones-Williams for defective construction. Jones-Williams’ CGL insurer Amerisure defended. The case was tried and a judgment was entered against Jones-Williams in favor of Town & Country. After Amerisure denied any obligation to pay the judgment, Town & Country sued Amerisure in a statutory direct action.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com.
Colorado statutory “property damage” caused by an “occurrence”
August 4, 2011 — CDCoverage.com
Colorado General Assembly House Bill 10-1394 was signed into law by the Governor on May 21, 2010, codified at Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-808 (2010)
13-20-808. Insurance policies issued to construction professionals
(1) (a) The general assembly finds and determines that:
(I) The interpretation of insurance policies issued to construction professionals is of vital importance to the economic and social welfare of the citizens of Colorado and in furthering the purposes of this part 8.
(II) Insurance policies issued to construction professionals have become increasingly complex, often containing multiple, lengthy endorsements and exclusions conflicting with the reasonable expectations of the insured.
(III) The correct interpretation of coverage for damages arising out of construction defects is in the best interest of insurers, construction professionals, and property owners.
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Reprinted courtesy of CDCoverage.com
Builder Cannot Receive Setoff in Construction Defect Case
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has dismissed an appeal in a San Diego construction defect case. In Smith v. Walters Group, Christopher and Maud Smith sued The Walters Group, a real estate developer, and Galen C. Pavelko, Inc, the builder of their home. Walters had bought five lots and hired Pavelko to build houses on them, selling one of these homes to the Smiths. “After moving in, the Smiths noticed a strong and obnoxious odor permeating the house.” The Smiths sued but were ordered to arbitrate instead, pursuant to a clause in the purchase contract. The Smiths were awarded $1.5 million at arbitration.
Walters requested that the arbitration remain open to determine if Walters was entitled to a setoff for settlements from defendants not involved in the arbitration. During this time, Pavelko made a settlement with the Smiths, which the court found was in good faith. At the same time, the arbitrator “reached the opposite conclusion.” The arbitrator concluded that “only settlements made ‘in good faith before verdict or judgment’ qualified for setoff.”
Walters moved that the trial court “‘correct’ the award,” but the trial court declined to do so and confirmed the award. In the appeal, Walters raised the issue of “whether Pavelko’s settlement occurred ‘before verdict or judgment.’” The appeals court dismissed the appeal, noting that “Walters would not be entitled to a $500,000 setoff if we reversed the trial court’s order determining the Smith-Pavelko settlement was made in good faith because Pavelko’s $500,000 payment was expressly conditioned on such an order.” They add that “were we to reverse the trial court’s order, Pavelko would have no obligation to pay the Smiths the $500,000.” This would then “deprive Walters of the corresponding statutory right to a setoff.”
Read the court’s decision…
Appeals Court Upholds Decision by Referee in Trial Court for Antagan v Shea Homes
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In the case Antangan v. Shea Homes Ltd. Partnership (Cal. App., 2012), Plaintiffs appealed “an order vacating a judgment and entering a modified judgment in their construction defect action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership,” while the Defendant, Shea Homes Limited Partnership (Shea Homes) appealed “an order of the judicial referee denying its motion to strike and tax costs.”
On the Antagon issue, the appeals court concluded that “the trial court did not err by vacating and modifying its judgment so that the cost of referee’s fees would be equally divided by the parties and consistent with a prior stipulation they filed in court.”
On the Shea Homes issue, the appeals court concluded: “1) the judicial referee did not err by ruling that plaintiffs’ offers to compromise (§ 998) were validly served on Shea Homes’ counsel, 2) the offers substantially complied with statutory requirements, 3) the offers were not required to be apportioned, and 4) the referee’s award of $5,000 as costs for a person assisting plaintiffs’ counsel was not an abuse of discretion.” The appeals court affirmed the judgment.
Here is a brief history of the trial case: “Plaintiffs Chito Antangan, Jimmy Alcova and other homeowners brought an action against defendants Shea Homes, Inc. and Shea Homes Limited Partnership for damages alleging that the properties they purchased from these ‘developer defendants’ were defective. Plaintiffs claimed numerous construction defects required them ‘to incur expenses’ for ‘restoration and repairs’ and the value of their homes had been diminished.”
In response, Shea Homes filed a motion for an order to appoint a judicial referee. The motion was granted and it was ruled that “a referee would ‘try all issues’ and ‘report a statement of decision to this court.’”
On May 10, 2010 the judicial referee (Thompson) “awarded plaintiffs damages and various costs, and ruled that ‘Shea Homes shall bear all of the Referee’s fees.’” The latter ruling would become a matter for contention later on.
In July of 2010, the plaintiffs “sought, among other things, $54,409.90 for expert fees, and $14,812.50 for the services of Melissa Fox for ‘exhibit preparation & trial presentation.’ Shea Homes filed a motion to strike and/or tax costs claiming: 1) Fox was a paralegal, 2) plaintiffs were not entitled to attorney’s fees, and 3) the fees for Fox’s services were an indirect and improper method to obtain attorney’s fees. The referee disagreed and awarded $5,000 for Fox’s services. The referee also ruled that plaintiffs had properly served valid offers to compromise (§ 998) on Shea Homes’ counsel in 2009. He said those offers to defendants in the case at that time did not have to be apportioned.”
“Antangan contends the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment, which ordered Shea Homes to pay all the referee’s fees. We disagree.”
Antagon contended that the trial court erred when it vacated and modified its original judgment regarding Shea Homes paying the referee’s fees. The appeals court disagreed: “A trial court has inherent authority to vacate or correct a judgment that is void on its face, incorrect, or entered by mistake. (§ 473; Rochin v. Pat Johnson Manufacturing Co. (1998),67 Cal.App.4th 1228; Olivera
Read the court’s decision…
Know the Minnesota Statute of Limitations for Construction Defect Claims
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Writing on the Benson Kerrane Storz Nelson web site, Alex Nelson gives an overview of the Minnesota laws covering statutes of limitation and repose. He notes that frequently when his firm declines to take a construction defect case its’ over a missed statute of limitation. He describes the time periods as both “short” and “ambigious.” The briefest limit is that a homeowner “has only 6 months within which to give written notice of the defect to the builder once the defect has manifested itself.” Any legal action must commence within two years of the same point.
The Minnesota statutes also have a six-year limitation, which starts for a single home at transfer of title to the first purchaser or when the purchaser takes possession, whichever happens first. For a condo, it is the last of “completion of the common element,” first unit sale or “Termination of Declarant control.” Fraud or misrepresentation also has a six-year limit, while negligence claims are limited to within the first two years “after the manifestation of the defect.”
The statues of repose also provide limits to filing construction defect lawsuits. Mr. Nelson points out that the longest are for negligence, fraud, and “major construction defects,” all of which have a ten-year limit. On the other hand, claims against general workmanship and materials must be made in the first year.
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Driver’s Death May Be Due to Construction Defect
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
A man driving a rental truck collided with a parking ramp at the Mall of America in Bloomington, Minnesota, leading to his death when the ramp broke and crushed the cab of the truck. One expert said that the ramp should have been built to withstand the impact. Tim Galarnyk told Fox News that the building feature didn’t’ even bear weight, describing it as “a cosmetic facial panel.” Nevertheless, in a contest with a truck he said the ramp portion should “peel it like a tin can before it takes the concrete element down.”
The Mall of American is not commenting on the accident.
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Defense for Additional Insured Not Barred By Sole Negligence Provision
August 11, 2011 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
A general contractor was entitled to a defense as an additional insured when the underlying complaint did not allege it was solely negligent. A-1 Roofing Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 2011 Ill. App. LEXIS 656 (Ill. Ct. App. June 24, 2011).
A-1 was the general contractor for a roof resurfacing job at a high school. Jack Frost Iron Works Inc. (“Frost”) was one of A-1’s subcontractors. Frost had a CGL policy with Navigators Insurance Company under which A-1 was an additional insured.
An employee of Frost’s subcontractor Midwest Sheet Metal Inc. was killed at the job site when a boom-lift he was operating flipped over. The boom-lift had been leased by another Frost subcontractor, Bakes Steel Erectors, Inc. (BSE). The deceased's estate filed suit against A-1, BSE and two other defendants.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com