Hospital Construction Firm Settles Defect Claim for $1.1 Million
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Law360 reports that Bovis Lend Lease has settled claims of $10 million in damages for $1.1 million. Bovis was building three annexes to a hospital in Oklahoma. The hospital alleged that a faulty moisture barrier system lead to damage throughout the hospital.
Bovis is a division of the Lend Lease Group, a multinational construction firm based Sydney, Australia.
Read the full story…
Colorado Statutes of Limitations and Repose, A First Step in Construction Defect Litigation
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Grund Dagner, a law firm operating in Denver and Boulder, Colorado notes on their blog that when defending a construction defect claim, one of their first steps is to determine if the claims are affected by the statutes of limitations or repose, and that they “have had much success raising these defenses with the court before trial.”
Colorado has a two-year statute of limitations, starting from when the homeowner discovers the defect. Further, Colorado’s statute of repose precludes lawsuits beginning “more than six years after the substantial completion of the improvement to the real property.”
Grund Dagner notes that they “recently obtained dismissal of claims related to eight of 22 buildings in a condominium project, where the homeowners in those building observed the defects more than two years before the HOA initiated its claims against our client.”
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Window Manufacturer Weathers Recession by Diversifying
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
American Openings, a Tuscon-based window manufacturer, has responded to the loss of its sales of windows for new home construction by moving into new markets. The Arizona Daily Star reports that American Openings used to see providing windows for new homes as half their business. Now, Tom Regina, the founder and president says “single family is just dead.”
Their products are insulated windows, designed to comply with Energy Star standards. Without new homes being built, now the company is focusing on homeowners and building owners looking for more energy efficient windows. As the windows have two or three panes and special coatings, homeowners using them are eligible for tax credits.
One of their newer products combines their energy-saving coatings with “break resistant” glass. The article notes that the windows repel “all but the most determined burglars.” However, the company is still awaiting special equipment to cut the glass.
Read the full story...
Contract Not So Clear in South Carolina Construction Defect Case
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has reversed a partial summary judgment issued by one of the lower courts in the case of The Retreat at Edisto Co-Owners Association v. The Retreat at Edisto. The underlying issues of the case deal with a construction defect complaint.
The lower court had concluded “Developer’s ‘First Amendment’ to the Master Deed required the Developer to satisfy the provision in the paragraph labeled ‘Master Deed Amendment or Phase II’ as a condition precedent to its election to proceed with the development of Phase II.”
The appeals court found that “the language of the First Amendment to the Master Deed is susceptible to more than one interpretation.” The court additionally concluded that the “Developer presented the requisite scintilla of evidence on the question of its intent in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact. As the material facts were in dispute, the appeals court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.
Read the court’s decision…
Background Owner of Property Cannot Be Compelled to Arbitrate Construction Defects
November 7, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In Truppi v. Pasco Engineering, John Quattro sued Property Management Contractors, Inc. over construction defects in William Truppi’s home. All parties are named in the suit. The California Court of Appeals ruled that Property Management Contractors, Inc. (PMCI) could not compel Mr. Quattro to arbitration.
The background of the case involves two houses built in Encinitas, California by PCMI: one for Mr. Truppi at 560 Neptune, and one for Mr. Quattro at 566 Neptune. Both contracts contained an arbitration provision. Mr. Quattro signed the contract for his residence and Mr. Truppi signed the other. Mr. Quattro then sued PCMI and its principal, William Gregory. Mr. Quattro claimed to be the true contracting party for the 560 Neptune residence and a third party beneficiary of the contract Mr. Truppi signed, and stated that PCMI was aware of this.
PCMI in a demurrer stated that Quattro “had only a ‘prospective beneficial interest in the property upon its eventual sale or lease.’” Mr. Quattro amended his complaint to account for the issues raised by PCMI. The court rejected PCMI’s demurrer to the amended complaint.
Finally, PCMI and Gregory asserted that Quattro was “not the real party in interest” and could not sue. PCMI continues to assert that Quattro lacks standing, but their attorney sent Quattro an e-mail stating, “While my client disputes that you are a party, and that you lack standing to assert the claim, to the extent you do so I believe you are obligated to proceed by way of arbitration.”
The court did not cover the issue of Quattro’s standing in the case, only if he could be compelled to arbitration. The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that Quattro could not be compelled to arbitrate the construction defect claim as neither he nor Gregory signed the contract in an individual capacity. Further, the court noted that PCMI and Gregory “denied the existence of an agreement between themselves and Quattro on the 560 contract,” and cannot compel arbitration on a non-existent agreement. And while non-signatories can, in some situations be compelled to arbitrate, the court found that “these cases are inapplicable because here they seek to have the alleged third party beneficiary (Quattro) compelled by a nonsignatory (Gregory).” The arbitration clause in question “expressly limited its application to persons or entities that signed the 560 contract.”
As Mr. Quattro was not a signatory to that agreement, the court found that he could not be held to its arbitration provision.
Read the court’s decision…
The Colorado Court of Appeals Rules that a Statutory Notice of Claim Triggers an Insurer’s Duty to Defend.
October 23, 2012 — David M. McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell
Gene and Diane Melssen d/b/a Melssen Construction (“Melssen”) built a custom home for the Holleys, during which period of time Melssen retained a CGL insurance coverage from Auto Owners Insurance Company. Soon after completion of the house, the Holleys noticed cracks in the drywall and, eventually, large cracks developed in the exterior stucco and basement slab. Thereafter, the Holleys contacted Melssen, the structural engineer, an attorney, and Auto-Owners, which assigned a claims adjuster to investigate the claim.
In April 2008, the Holleys sent Melssen a statutory notice of claim pursuant to C.R.S. § 13-20-803.5 (“NOC”). In this NOC, the Holleys claimed approximately $300,000 in damages related to design and construction defects. The Holleys also provided a list of claimed damages and estimated repairs, accompanied by two reports from the Holleys’ consultant regarding the claimed design and construction defects. In June 2008, Melssen tendered the defense and indemnity of the claim to Auto-Owners. While Auto-Owners did not deny the claim at that time, it did not inspect the property or otherwise adjust the claim. Thereafter, in October 2008, Auto-Owners sent Melssen a letter denying coverage on the basis that the damage occurred outside of the applicable policy period.
Ultimately, Melssen settled the claims against it for $140,000.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of David McLain, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. McLain can be contacted at mclain@hhmrlaw.com
There is No Non-Delegable Duty on the Part of Residential Builders in Colorado
August 2, 2012 — Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC
Recently, in the Arapahoe District Court, the Honorable Michael Spear, issued an order holding that builders do not owe a non-delegable duty to homeowners. In Marx and Corken v. Alpert Custom Homes, Inc., et al., Judge Spear’s order came in response to plaintiffs’ motion for determination of question of law seeking a finding that the defendants owed a non-delegable duty to the plaintiffs and thus, to strike defendants’ designation of nonparties at fault. After being fully briefed, Judge Spear, found that such a non-delegable duty does not exist.
The case arises from the construction of a single-family residence in Aurora, Colorado. Through the construction and interaction with Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. and Scott and Sally Alpert, the defendants, Paul Marx and Kay Corken, the plaintiffs claimed they suffered various damages and losses, and brought claims for breach of contract-warranty, breach of contract, violation of the Colorado Consumer Protection Act, breaches of the implied covenant of good faith, promissory estoppel, willful breach of contract, and quantum meruit. During litigation, the defendants filed a designation of nonparties at fault, which named several parties which were at fault for the alleged construction defects at issue in the case. The pertinent nonparties named were subcontractors of defendant Alpert Custom Homes, Inc. during the construction of the residence.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Brady Iandiorio, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Iandiorio can be contacted at iandiorio@hhmrlaw.com
Construction Defects: 2010 in Review
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Candace Matson, Harold Hammersmith, and Helen Lauderdale, all of Sheppard Mullin, recently looked at design and construction defect litigation in 2010. They look at three California construction law cases. In one prominent case, the developer’s claims were barred under California law. However, the court did allow a claim for breach of the duty to defend.
In a second case, the California Supreme Court ruled that a duty to defend is separate from a duty to indemnify. A developer sought to include its engineering subcontractor in a suit. The subcontractor unsuccessfully argued that it had no duty to defend as the homeowners had not sued it.
The third case involved a lawyer who had represented a homeowner accused a libel against a construction firm and then later represented one of the subcontractors the firm had employed. The California Court of appeals concluded that there was no conflict of interest and so the contractor could not disqualify the subcontractor’s lawyer.
Read the full story…
Ohio Casualty’s and Beazer’s Motions were Granted in Part, and Denied in Part
May 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The case Trinity Homes LLC and Beazer Homes Investments LLC has reached the summary judgment stage. The remaining plaintiffs are Trinity Homes LLC (Trinity) and Beazer Homes Investments LLC (Beazer), and the only defendant remaining is Ohio Casualty Insurance Company (Ohio Casualty). “Ohio Casualty has filed a motion for summary judgment (Dkt. #409) on all claims against it, and Trinity and Beazer have filed a cross-motion seeking partial summary judgment (Dkt. #431) in their favor.” Ohio Casualty’s Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part and denied in part, and Beazer’s motion was granted in part and denied in part.
The court’s ruling presented a bit of background on the companies involved in the litigation: “Trinity is an Indiana limited liability company with its principal place of business in Indiana and is one of several construction related companies owned by Beazer, which is a limited liability company incorporated under the laws of Delaware having its principal place of business in Atlanta, Georgia. Beazer’s predecessor, Beazer Homes Investment Corporation, acquired the stock of Crossman Communities, Inc. in 2002. Crossman and its subsidiary owned all interests in Trinity. Beazer and Trinity are in the business of residential real estate development and construction.”
Furthermore, “Ohio Casualty’s home office is in Ohio, where it is incorporated. It sells insurance policies to commercial entities such as Plaintiffs. It purchased a book of business from Great American Insurance Company, a subsidiary of which had sold commercial general liability policies (‘CGL’) and umbrella liability policies to Trinity, covering the period of time between May 1, 1994 through May 1, 1999. For ease of reference, we will refer to these policies as the Ohio Casualty policies. Trinity sold and acted as a general contractor for the construction of new homes in Central Indiana throughout the period of time in which the Ohio Casualty policies were in place.”
The court disagreed with almost every argument put forth by Ohio Casualty. However, they did concede “that Ohio Casualty is obligated to indemnify Trinity only for damages arising during its policy periods for pro rata liability as opposed to several and indivisible, by reason of its having limited its indemnity obligation to ‘those sums’ that Trinity becomes liable to pay for property damage which ‘occurs during the policy period.’”
Finally, the court ruled that “Ohio Casualty Company’s Motion For Summary Judgment (Dkt. #409) is GRANTED IN PART, that is, to the extent that Beazer is not an insured under the Ohio Casualty insurance policies, but the motion is DENIED in all other respects.”
The court further ruled that “Trinity and Beazer’s Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (Dkt. #431) is GRANTED IN PART, that is: (1) Trinity is an insured under the Ohio Casualty CGL and umbrella policies in effect for the time period from May 1, 1994 to May 1, 1999; (2) the claims at issue in the Underlying Lawsuits are "property damage" claims resulting from an "occurrence" and are therefore within the policy coverage provided under the Ohio Casualty Policy; and (3) none of the exclusions in the Ohio Casualty Policy bars coverage. Trinity and Beazer’s Motion is DENIED in all other respects. Moreover, material questions of fact remain with respect to whether payments made to the 54 homeowners, who were part of the putative class in the underlying Colon class action but were not included in the certified settlement class, were voluntary payments and as such do not qualify for indemnification. Material questions of fact also preclude a summary ruling on the issue of whether Ohio Casualty is estopped from raising their voluntary nature as a defense to indemnity.”
Read the court’s decision…
Save a Legal Fee: Prevent Costly Lawsuits With Claim Limitation Clauses
April 25, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Cousel
Ever had that lingering problem with a contracting partner that went away for awhile and then came back to bite you ? years later? In Washington, construction contract claims can be raised for up to six years after substantial completion. Six years!? Why would I want to wait that long to find out if I have a problem? You don’t have to.
Over the past few years, I have discussed the notion of “contractual claim periods” on The Builders Counsel. For today’s Save a Legal Fee column, I cannot think of a better topic. These provisions are specifically intended to save you from unnecessary legal fees that might arise if a problem goes unnoticed for too long.
Contractual claim periods are simply a way to reduce the amount of time that a contracting party has to raise a claim against its contracting partner. For example, a subcontractor might require that a general contractor raise any claim that it might have ? for defective or incomplete work, injury, damages, etc ? within a particular amount of time or forever lose the ability to raise the claim in a legal proceeding.
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Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Insurer Has Duty to Defend Despite Construction Defects
January 6, 2012 — CDJ Staff
In a case the judge attributed to “shoddy masonry work,” the US District Court of Illinois has rendered a decision in AMCO Insurance Company v. Northern Heritage Builders. Northern Heritage built a home in Chicago for Michael McGrath (who joined Northern Heritage as a defendant). According to the decision, “seven months after he moved into the house, McGrath noticed water coming in the house and warped millwork.” This was attributed to porous block, installed by the mason with Northern Heritage’s knowledge.
McGrath sued National Heritage for both the damage to his house and its contents. The court rejected his claim for the contents. For the damages to his house, he was awarded $601,570.50 in damages. He also sued his homeowner’s insurance carrier for damages not covered in his suit against National Heritage. There he was awarded $1,130,680.16.
AMCO informed National Heritage that it had neither duty to defend nor duty to indemnify. The judge considered whether AMCO had a duty to defend. Under Illinois law, “damage to a construction project resulting from construction defects is not an ‘accident’ or ‘occurrence’ because it represents the natural and ordinary consequence of faulty construction.” However, it is noted that while if the defects lead only to damage to the project itself, there is no occurrence, “if the building owner asserts damages to other property besides the construction itself, there is an ‘occurrence’ and ‘property damage.’” The judge further noted that were construction defects an occurrence, “shoddy work” would be rewarded by double pay, once by the homeowner and a second time by the insurer. Judge Kendall concluded that as McGrath had alleged damage to the contents of his house, AMCO had a duty to defend National Heritage.
She then looked at the issue of whether AMCO had a duty to indemnify. Should they pay the $601,570.50? Judge Kendall noted that “the duty to indemnify is narrower than the duty to defend.” The key point here was that once McGrath’s insurance carrier covered him for the damage to the contents of his house, “AMCO’s duty to defend ended.” Once McGrath “only sought damages for the natural consequences of faulty workmanship” there was no occurrence, hence nothing for AMCO to cover.
Judge Kendall granted a summary dismissal of AMCO’s claim that they had no duty to defend while upholding their claim that they had no duty to indemnify.
Read the court’s decision…
Who Is To Blame For Defective — And Still LEED Certified — Courthouse Square?
September 1, 2011 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
Remember Courthouse Square? I sure do. We have talked about the closed and evacuated LEED certified building a couple of times here on Builders Counsel. Well, it’s back in the news. This time building professionals are pointing fingers — but there is some talk about a fix. Still, its LEED certification remains.
If you read my past articles about Courthouse Square, you can get caught up on this mess. The short of it is that Salem, Oregon had the five-story government building and bus mall completed in 2000 for $34 Million. It was awarded LEED certification during the USGBC’s infancy. Last year, it became public that the building had significantly defective concrete and design. The Salem-Keizer Transit District worked with the City of Salem to shut the building down, and it has not been occupied since.
Last fall, Courthouse Square failed thorough forensic testing leading to a lengthy bout with a number of insurers. The contractors and designers had been hauled into court, but the Transit District was able to settle with the architect and contractors. The only remaining party involved in the lawsuit appears to be the engineering firm, Century West Engineering. Most expert reports have pinned the responsibility for the poor design and materials on Century West’s shoulders.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Insurer Not Liable for Construction Defect Revealed by Woodpecker
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that an insurance provision that excluded construction defects must stand in Friedberg v. Chubb, granting a summary judgment to the insurance firm.
The Friedbergs discovered extensive water damage to their home after a woodpecker drilled a hole in a vertical support. They sought insurance coverage under their Chubb “Masterpiece” policy. The decision quotes the policy as covering “all risk of physical loss” “unless stated otherwise or an exclusion applies.” These exclusions included “gradual or sudden loss,” “structural movement,” and “faulty planning, construction or maintenance,” but the policy covered “ensuing covered loss unless another exclusion applies.”
Chubb’s expert determined that the Friedbergs’ home had defective construction, and “attributed the damage to the beams and walls below the beam to a failure to install control joints.” After Chubb denied coverage, the Friedbergs sued, although the court ruled that “even under the Friedbergs’ theory, the water damage was a loss caused by faulty construction and therefore excluded under the policy.”
On appeal, the Friedbergs argued that “the loss resulted from the combination of both faulty construction and the presence of water” and that Minnesota’s “concurrent causation” doctrine must apply, which according to the decision, “when a loss results from both a covered peril and an excluded peril, coverage exists unless the excluded peril is the ‘overriding cause’ of the loss.” The court rejected this reasoning, noting that “once the house was plagued with faulty construction, it was a foreseeable and natural consequence that water would enter.”
The Friedbergs also contended that “the damage caused by the intrusion of water into their home is an ‘ensuing covered loss’ for which they are due coverage.” The court also rejected this claim, noting that Minnesota law excludes defective construction from the ensuing loss provision. The court said that “the Friedbergs’ reading of their ensuing-loss clause, by contrast, would dramatically limit their policy’s faulty-construction exclusion, because almost ‘any loss cause by’ faulty construction could also be characterized as an ensuing loss under an all-risk policy.”
Read the court’ decision…
Court Orders House to be Demolished or Relocated
April 26, 2011 — April 26, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
Decision Affirmed in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision by the trial court in Central Arkansas Foundation Homes, LLC v. Rebecca Choate. In the trial case, Central Arkansas Foundation Homes (CAFH) sought payment for a home built for Choate, while Choate alleged that the builders committed multiple construction defects including using the wrong foundation materials and positioning the house in the wrong direction.
After the house was built, CAFH contacted Choate regarding payment, however, Choate alleged that the finished product did not match the contract. “ After CAFH completed construction, it obtained permanent home financing for Choate and tried to contact her to close the transaction. Choate did not respond until October 2005, when she sent CAFH a list of alleged construction defects, including that the house was facing in the wrong direction; that it was not built on a slab; and that the fireplace, garbage disposal, driveway, and storage area were missing. CAFH replied to Choate in writing, telling her that she had until January 6, 2006, to close on the house or CAFH would sell it. The correspondence enclosed worksheets showing that the amount Choate would owe at closing exceeded $94,000, which included interest that had accrued on the as-yet unpaid construction loan.”
Initially, the court found in favor of CAFH. “On April 18, 2007, Choate’s attorney withdrew from representing her. Soon thereafter, CAFH’s attorney asked the court to set a final hearing on the case. The attorney purportedly sent Choate a letter by regular mail on May 15, 2007, advising her that the case was set for trial on July 9, 2007. Choate, however, did not appear. CAFH did appear, and its general manager, John Oldner, testified to events leading up to the case and the amount of damages claimed. According to Oldner, the interest on the construction loan had accrued to the point that CAFH now sought $104,965.88 from Choate. The court found in favor of CAFH and entered judgment for that amount, plus attorney fees, on July 18, 2007. The court ruled that CAFH could sell the house and either remit any excess to Choate or look to Choate for the deficiency if the sales price did not cover the judgment.”
However, Choate successfully argued that she did not receive notice of the trial. A new trial was ordered, and the outcome was quite different. “On June 6, 2008, the circuit court entered judgment for Choate, ruling that the house was not in substantial compliance with the parties’ contract and that the contract should be rescinded. The court found that the house suffered from numerous construction defects, that the contract contemplated a slab rather than a concrete-pier foundation, and that CAFH ignored Choate’s complaints that the house was facing the wrong way. The judgment directed CAFH to hold Choate harmless on the construction loan, to deed Choate’s two acres back to her, and to remove the house from Choate’s property.”
The Court of Appeals “found that Choate would be unjustly enriched by retaining the benefit of the septic systems and utility lines that CAFH installed on her land. The court therefore awarded $5340 to CAFH as a quantum-meruit recovery for the value of that work. CAFH contends that the award is not sufficient, but we see no clear error.” In the end, the Court of Appeals provided this reason for declining to reverse the trial court’s decision: “The court in this case apparently concluded that the house constructed by CAFH was so fundamentally at odds with Choate’s contractual expectations that she was not unjustly enriched and should simply be, as nearly as possible, returned to the status quo ante. Accordingly, the court ordered the house removed from her property and permitted CAFH to either relocate the house or salvage the house’s materials and unused appliances. We decline to reverse the court’s weighing of the equities in this manner.”
Read the court’s decision…
“Other Insurance” and Indemnity Provisions Determine Which Insurer Must Cover
September 1, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
A policy’s “other insurance” clause and a contractual indemnity provision were at the root for determining which of two insurers had to cover for injuries at a construction site. Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 76061 (N.D. Calif. July 14, 2011).
Hathaway was the general contractor at a demolition and construction project. Hathaway was insured by Zurich. Reinhardt Roofing was the roofing subcontractor. Reinhardt was insured by Valley Forge under a policy which named Hathaway as an additional insured. The subcontract also required Reinhardt to indemnify Hathaway for acts or omissions arising from Reinhardt’s work unless Hathaway was solely negligent.
Four of Reinhardt’s workers were injured when a canopy roof on which they were working collapsed. At the time of the accident, Hathaway’s on-site supervisor was inspecting a gap in the canopy roof, but did not order Reinhardt’s workers to stop working.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Guilty Pleas Draw Renewed Interest In Nevada’s Construction Defect Laws
December 9, 2011 — CDJ Staff
A report this week by David McGrath Schwarz of the Las Vegas Sun suggests that Nevada’s construction defect laws will be a point of much contention in upcoming legislative sessions. The report cites renewed interest in the state’s construction defect laws due to ongoing federal investigations of construction defect attorney Nancy Quon and construction company owner Leon Benzer. Guilty pleas have been entered by at least ten individuals including an attorney, property managers, straw purchasers, and former HOA board members.
The article suggests that Nevada’s Chapter 40 laws are easily manipulated to the detriment of Nevada’s homebuilding industry. Construction industry lobbyists have tried unsuccessfully to change the laws in past legislative sessions.
The Sun’s article speculates that the building industry might be able to gain legislative concessions due to the volume of guilty pleas and what it refers to as examples of Chapter 40 abuses. ”With federal authorities collecting guilty pleas, the construction industry has prime examples of the system being abused, and how lucrative it can be for attorneys.”
Read the full story…
Construction Defects and Contractor-Owners
July 10, 2012 — CDJ Staff
On the expert advice site Avvo.com, a user asks if he can be sued for construction defects by the new owner of a building for which he served as general contractor and then owned for four years. He had construction insurance, but does not think he had construction defect insurance.
A lawyer responding to his question says that “you could be sued.” In the event of a suit, “you would have to bring claims against all of your subcontractors.”
Read the full story…
Washington Court of Appeals Upholds Standard of Repose in Fruit Warehouse Case
August 4, 2011 — CDJ Staff
On July 28, the Washington Court of Appeals ruled in Clasen Fruit & Cold Storage v. Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. that more than six years had passed since a contractor had concluded work and so granted a summary dismissal of the suit.
Frederick & Michael Construction Co., Inc. (F&M) was contracted to construct several buildings for Clasen Fruit and Cold Storage. These were completed in March, 1999. The buildings suffered wind damage to the roofs in 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2006. In the first two incidents, F&M repaired the roofs with Clasen paying for repairs.
In 2005, Clasen hired Continuous Gutter to make repairs. The final incident was the collapse of the roof of one building. This was attributed to “excessive moisture in the roof’s vapor barriers.” At this point, Clasen demanded that F&M pay for repair and replacement costs. In 2008, Clasen sued F&M for damages for breach of contract and negligent design and construction of the roof.
The decision then covered the meanings, in Washington law, of “termination of services” and “substantial completion.” The panel concluded that construction was “substantially completed in 1997” and “relevant services” by 2001. “But Clasen did not sue until 2008, some seven years after termination of any roof related services.”
Read the court’s decision…
