ANAHEIM CALIFORNIA CONSTRUCTION EXPERT WITNESS
DIRECTORY AND CAPABILITIES

Pier Fire Started by Welders

Welders working on Pier 29 in San Francisco were preparing the building for the America’s Cup sailing race. Instead, they accidentally caused $2.4 million in damages. Mindy Talmadge, a fire department spokesperson, attributed the fire to crews welding a latter to a wall. According to Talmadge, a spark entered a crack in the concrete wall and “the wood on the building underneath was really dry.” It took firefighters more than two hours to extinguish the blaze.

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Florida Property Bill Passes Economic Affairs Committee with Amendments

The Florida Property Bill (HBB 803) was passed by the Economic Affairs Committee by a vote of 11-7, according to Property Casualty 360, after adopting nine new amendments. The additions to the bill included limiting notice of claims to a set number of years, extending the statute of limitation on property claims from five years to six years, among others.

HB 803 and SB 408, the Senate companion bill, focus primarily on residential property insurance. They make changes to the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, while also promoting increased notification of policy changes to policyholders. Sections of the bills provide minor fixes such as renaming Citizens Property Insurance Corporation to Taxpayer-Funded Property Insurance Corporation. However, other sections of the bills contain more significant policy changes such as sinkhole coverage and hurricane claims.

The bills’ intent, according to the SunSentinel.com, is to reduce fraudulent claims and to bring new insurers into the insurance market. However, SunSentinel.com also reports that the bills may drastically increase property insurance premiums.

Read the full Property Casualty 360 article...

Read the full Sun Sentinel article...

New Apartment Tower on the Rise in Seattle

The Seattle Times reports that groundbreaking is planned for a forty-story tower in Seattle. The building process will take at least five years, during which time, according to the paper, there will be nearly eight thousand new apartments in Seattle. The planned tower will add another 386 units to that.

The developer, Holland Partner Group, has four other apartments buildings planned or in construction currently, which will account for more than a thousand of the units being added to the city’s apartment stock.

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Construction Defects Leave Animal Shelter Unusable

The Press Democrat reports that the Healdsburg Animal Shelter is proceeding in its lawsuit against the architect, general contractor, and subcontractors of its unfinished new facility. Shelter officials described the building as “effectively uninhabitable,” and the board has suggested that the building might have to be demolished. The chair of the shelter board told donors that “your investment is protected.”

The defects in the building include cracked concrete slabs and gaps around windows. However, even without these defects, the shelter alleges that the architect failed to correct design flaws.

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Homeowner may pursue negligence claim for construction defect, Oregon Supreme Court holds

In Abraham v. T. Henry, Oregon’s court of appeals held that a Oregon’s court of appeals holds that a homeowner may sue builder for common law negligence absent a contractual provision that forecloses such a claim. Plaintiff homeowners hired defendant contractors to build a house. When plaintiffs discovered defects in the construction years later, they sued for negligence.

The Court of Appeals held that the parties’ contractual relationship did not prevent a negligence claim, and that plaintiffs were entitled to pursue a negligence per se claim based on a violation of the Oregon Building Code.

The Supreme Court affirmed, but on a somewhat different basis. First, according to the Court, a construction defect claim concerns damage to property — and not mere economic losses — and thus is not barred by the economic loss doctrine. Second, the existence

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Tacoma Construction Site Uncovers Gravestones

The Seattle Times reports that a transit construction project has uncovered about twenty-five gravestones. The area was historically sensitive, as it is in territory once occupied by the Puyallup Tribe. At current report, no human remains have been found and the article cites the project?s archeological consultant as describing the gravestones as “not historically significant.”

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Court Requires Adherence to “Good Faith and Fair Dealing” in Construction Defect Coverage

The California Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Allied Framers, Inc. v. Golden Bear Insurance Company. Allied had been sued in a construction defect case and its primary insurer had become insolvent. Coverage for Allied’s defense was paid for by the California Insurance Guarantee Association through June 8, 2006. When warned that CIGA’s involvement was ending, Allied notified Golden Bear, which declined to provide coverage.

In the matters that followed, Golden Bear claimed that Allied had not exhausted its $1 million in primary insurance. Allied then showed that $1 million had already been paid out in the case. A few months thereafter, Golden Bear offered a $500,000 settlement on behalf of Allied which was rejected. Thereafter, Golden Bear hired new counsel to defend Allied. Golden Bear received, but allegedly did not pay, invoices Allied sent from their former counsel. Golden Bear finally settled the construction defect case for $2 million.

Allied’s original counsel sued Allied for payment. Golden Bear declined coverage. Allied then claimed that Golden Bear liable on several counts, arising from its failure to settle the construction defect action earlier than it did and its failure to pay Allied’s counsel. Golden Bear demurred, arguing that Allied had now exhausted is coverage with the $2 million settlement. The lower court sustained Golden Bear’s demurrer, dismissing Allied’s complaints.

The appeal court reviewed Allied’s seven complaints and sustained most of them. However, the court did reverse the trial court’s order in regard to Allied’s complaint that Golden Bear breached an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The appeals court was not convinced that Golden Bear properly evaluated the settlement demand in the underlying construction defect case. The court found three other ways in which Golden Bear’s actions might show bad faith, in refusing to pay defense fees “after promising [Allied] such costs would be paid in full,” “failing to advise Allied about ‘actual or potential negative consequences of agreeing to the proposed settlement,’” and that their choice of counsel “failed to protect [Allied’s] interests in the negotiation.”

Read the court’s decision…

The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 800¹ in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 2782² has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)³ Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.⁴

This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.⁵

2005 AMENDMENT

The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”⁶ In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

2007 AMENDMENT

The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

2008 AMENDMENT

The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

2011 AMENDMENT

Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.⁷

The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

CONCLUSION

The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.

El Paso Increases Surety Bond Requirement on Contractors

The city of El Paso has recently increased surety bonds required of contractors from $10,000 to $50,000, according to the El Paso Times. Proponents of the increase believe it was necessary to protect homeowners from fly-by-night builders, while opponents argue that the increase will have an adverse effect on an industry in that is already suffering due to the economic slowdown.

Arguments for and against the increase have been flooding the blogosphere with their views. Christian Dorobantescu on the Small Business Entrepreneur Blog claims that “only about 15% of the city’s 2,500 contractors had been able to secure a higher bond to remain eligible for work after the new requirements were announced.” However, insurance companies have a different take. “From a surety broker standpoint, most contractors will be able qualify for the bond; some will just have to pay higher premium rates to obtain it,” a recent post on the Surety1 blog argues.

While the increased bond may help homeowners deal with construction defect claims, it is not clear what effect it will have on builders in El Paso.

Read more from the El Paso Times…

Read more from the Small Business Entrepreneur Blog…

Read more from the Surety1 Blog…

Contractor Convicted of Additional Fraud

A Pennsylvania contractor in prison for fraud has been convicted with insurance fraud. The York Daily Record reports that Steven D. Gebhart was already in jail for fraud for about $350,000 for work he either failed to finish or even start or by using substandard materials and practices when he was convicted of insurance fraud. Gebbert’s offices were destroyed in a fire that was later determined to be arson. He was not charged with this, but instead for overestimating his losses to the insurance company. Sentencing for the fraud charge will be on December 21.

Read the full story…

Ensuing Loss Provision Does Not Salvage Coverage

The insureds' home was built in 1989. In 2006, extensive water damage was found to the house. The insureds notified their carrier, Chubb. The insureds had coverage for all risks unless stated otherwise in the policy or if an exclusion applied.

Chubb hired an adjustor who determined that defective construction had enabled water to enter the wall and beam systems. Chubb denied coverage under the faulty planning, construction or maintenance exclusion.

Read the full story…

Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Homeowner Has No Grounds to Avoid Mechanics Lien

The California Court of Appeals has rejected a motion by a homeowner in a dispute with the contractor who built an extension to his home. In McCracken v. Pirvulete, Mr. McCracken filed a mechanics lien after Mr. Pirvulete failed to complete payment. The matter went to trial with a series of exhibits that showed “the contractual relationship was strained and the parties disagreed over performance and payment.” As a result of the trial, the court awarded Mr. McCracken, the contractor, $1,922.22.

Mr. Pirvulete appealed, contending that the court had not allowed his daughter to act as a translator, that the court had failed to give him sufficient time to present his case, that the mechanics lien should have been dismissed, and several other claims, all before a formal judgment was issued. After the court formalized its judgment and rejected the appeal, Mr. Pirvulete appealed again.

The appeals court found that Mr. Pirvulete did not provide an adequate record for review. The court dismissed Mr. Pirvulete’s claims. The court notes that Mr. Pirvulete claimed that a request for a discovery period was denied, however, he has provided neither the request nor the denial. The trial court has no record of either.

Nor was there a record of a request that Mr. Pirvulete’s daughter provide translation. The court notes, “so far as we can glean from the record provided, the Register of Actions states, ‘Trial to proceed without Romanian Interpreter for Defendant; Daughter present to interpret if needed.’” Additionally, the court found that “there has been no showing that his facility with the English language is or was impaired in any way or that there was any portion of any proceeding, which he did not understand.”

Further, the appeals court found there were no grounds for a new trial, despite Mr. Pirvulete’s filings. The court concluded, “The owner has failed to provide a record adequate for review of most, if not all, of the claims of error. Some issues are not cognizable because they relate to entirely separate proceedings, and not the trial below. To the limited extent that the claims are examinable, the owner has made no showing of error.” The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court against Mr. Pirvulete.

Read the court’s decision…

Residential Construction: Shrinking Now, Growing Later?

Jim Haugey, the Chief Economist for Reed Construction Data noted that new residential construction spending fell 0.2% in June and a slightly larger drop of 0.5% in residential remodeling. While economic growth is still low, Haugey states that homebuilders have “record low inventories.” He forecasts a shrinkage of 1.5% in 2011, followed by about 20% growth in 2012.

Read the full story…

Anti-Assignment Provision Unenforceable in Kentucky

On a certified question from the Federal District Court, the Supreme Court of Kentucky decided that an anti-assignment provision in a policy is unenforceable.Wehr Constructors v. Paducah Div. Assur. Co. of Am., 2012 Ky. LEXIS 183 (Ky. Oct. 25, 2012).

Before building an addition to its hospital, Murray Calloway County Hospital purchased a builder's risk policy from Assurance Company of America.The policy provided, "Your rights and duties under this policy may not be transferred without Assurance's written consent . . . ." The Hospital contracted with Wehr Constructors to install concrete subsurfaces and vinyl floors in order to expand the hospital. After installation, a portion of the floors and subsurface work was damaged. The Hospital submitted a claim to Assurance for $75,000, but the claim was denied.

Wehr sued the Hospital to recover money for its work on the construction project. In settling the case, the Hospital assigned to Wehr any claim or rights the Hospital had against Assurance.

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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com

Foundation Arbitration Doesn’t Preclude Suing Over Cracks

The Louisiana Court of Appeals has reversed the decision of a lower court, allowing a construction defect case to go through. In Greer v. Town Construction Company, the Greers hired Town Construction to build a home in Baton Rouge. The business relationship went sour, with disputes over “costs, change orders, workmanship, and timeliness issues.”

Town Construction filed an arbitration claim for the unpaid contract balance. In the counterclaim, the Greers made claims of mold and mildew problems, and wall cracks that they attributed to a “structural defect in the foundation.” In arbitration, Town Construction was awarded the full contract balance plus extra costs and interest, while the Greers were awarded for their structural claims.

Three years later, the Greers found additional cracks and filed a suit against Town Construction. Town Construction argued that the Greer’s lawsuit should be dismissed, as the claims had already been through the arbitration process. The district court agreed with Town Construction and dismissed the suit.

The appeals court noted that the Greers would have no ground for a suit if the arbitration was a “valid and final judgment,” and went on to note that there was no evidence in the trial record that the arbitration met this qualification. The court noted that although it was clear that both parties had agreed to the decisions of the arbiter, under Louisiana law, arbitration is not final until it has been “rendered by a court with jurisdiction over subject mater and over parties.”

The court remanded the case to the lower court, noting that “the district court is obligated to first determine whether a valid arbitration award is in existence and had been confirmed before considering the merits of the exception. The court noted that their decision “should not be read to express any opinion as to the merits of the claims or as to the propriety of damages sought in the Greer’s lawsuit.”

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Webinar on Insurance Disputes in Construction Defects

Seth Lamden, of the firm Neal Gerber Eisenberg will be presenting a webinar on “Insurance Coverage Disputes in Construction Defects” on July 17, 2012 at 1 p.m. EDT. Mr. Lamden’s presentation will focus on “handling both the construction and insurance components of construction defect claims.” He will be discussing recent case law and new insurance products. The presentation will present information on evaluating various types of insurance policies, explaining common issues, contract requirement, and the economic loss doctrine. Mr. Lamden will advise attendees on how to avoid getting into a construction defect case. He will conclude his presentation with a brief question-and-answer session.

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Nevada Assembly Sends Construction Defect Bill to Senate

In a 26 to 16 vote, the Nevada Assembly has passed Assembly Bill 401, which extends the time limit for legal action over home construction defects. According to the Las Vegas Sun, Assembly member Marcus Conklin, Democrat of Las Vegas, said the bill was about “keeping the consumer whole.” However, Ira Hansen, Republican of Sparks, told the sun that suits are happening before contractors can make repairs. The bill would allow attorney fees even if repairs are made.

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A Downside of Associational Standing - HOA's Claims Against Subcontractors Barred by Statute of Limitations

In multi-family construction defect litigation in Colorado, homeowners associations rely on associational standing to pursue claims affecting more than two units and to bring claims covering an entire development. This practice broadens an association’s case beyond what individual, aggrieved owners would otherwise bring on their own against a developer or builder-vendor. However, reliance on associational standing to combine homeowners’ defect claims into a single lawsuit has its drawbacks to homeowners.

A recent order in the case Villa Mirage Condominium Owners’ Association, Inc., v. Stetson 162, LLC, et al., in El Paso County District Court, presents an example. There, the HOA unsuccessfully sought a determination from the court that its claims against subcontractors were not barred by the statute of limitations. To do so, the HOAs attempted to apply the Colorado Common Interest Ownership Act (“CCIOA”), which governs the creation and operation of HOAs, and a statute intended to apply to persons under a legal disability.

Under CCIOA, during the period of “declarant control” the developer may appoint members to the association’s executive board until sufficient homeowners have moved into the development and taken seats on the board.

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Reprinted courtesy of Bret Cogdill of Higgins, Hopkins, McClain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Cogdill can be contacted at cogdill@hhmrlaw.com.