Increased Expenditure on Injuries for New York City School Construction
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
You can buy a lot of bandages for $270 million, but even though the expenses are related to the New York City schools, the money is being budgeted by the School Construction Agency as what they expect to pay for injuries and liability expenses related to school construction. The New York Post notes that this is nearly ten times what the city spent in 2000 on workers' compensation and liability claims. Michael Elmdendorf of the General Contractors Association likened injury compensation to a broken slot machine, telling the Post, "when you pull that lever, you win." A spokesperson from the Department of Education, Margie Feinberg, attributed the rise to higher medical care costs.
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Court Consolidates Cases and Fees in Soil Construction Defect Case
August 16, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The California Court of Appeals has ruled in Burrow v. JTL Development. JTL Development had appealed a judgement in a construction defect case in which JTL Development and Highland Development were found liable for damage due to homes built on unstable and improperly compacted soil. The two companies were sued by the two sets of homeowners, the Burrows and the Balls, and their cases were consolidated at trial. Each family was awarded $700,000 in damages. This judgement had also been appealed and affirmed by the appeals court. In the current case, an additional $235,800 in cost-of-proof sanctions had been awarded to the two families.
Before the trial, Dale Burrows, Charles Ball, and Laurie Ball “asked JTL and Highland to admit that they ‘approved grading plans’ for the Burrows’ and Balls’ properties; ‘had knowledge that the [properties] contained improperly compacted fill’; ‘had knowledge that the [properties were’ not properly prepared for structures’; and ‘did not provide Plaintiffs with a complete soils report’ prepared by Gorian & Associates.” These were requests 14, 19, 20, and 22. JTL and Highland denied all of these.
At trial, the Burrows and Balls proved that all these were true. JTL and Highland’s geotechnical subcontractor, Gorian & Associates, had “recommended that Highland remove and re-compact the entire tract to a depth of 25 feet.” JTL and Highland did not follow this recommendation, “in order to avoid expense.”
After judgment, the Burrows and Balls moved for $582,587.45 for “attorneys’ fees and costs incurred proving the truth of requests for admission.” JTL and Highland claimed that only Dale Burrows could recover fees, but that also the fees were not recoverable. Joe Lynch of Highland “declared that he always believed the soils under the Burrows and Balls homes were properly compacted.” The Burrows and Balls responded with six identical sets of requests for admissions and the court awarded each of them twenty-five percent of $235,800, with JTL and Highland each responsible for fifty percent.
The appeals court noted that JTL and Highland filed a timely appeal and goes on to notes the four circumstances under which a responding party does not have to pay costs and fees. The court concluded that none of these were met. Instead of waiving the request, JTL and Highland denied the request, stating “without in any manner waiving the foregoing objection, responding party denies the request for admission.”
Nor was the admission “of no substantial importance,” instead the court said that the matters were of “substantial importance,” and the “trial would have been shortened by their admission. Highland and JTL “relied on Gorian when it denied the request,” but the trial court “discredited Lynch’s assertions,” finding that “Highland knew the soil was improperly compacted.”
As all plaintiffs had identical discovery requests, the court rejected the claim that only Dale Burrows was entitled to an award.
Read the court’s decision…
Construction Company Head Pleads Guilty to Insurance and Tax Fraud
December 20, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The former head of Orients Construction Company and of Melrose Construciton Company, Herlindo Garcia-Merlos, has entered a guilty plea to charges that the gave false informoation to his insurer, New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Group, for more than three years in order to lower his workers compensation payments. Mr. Garcia-Merlos was able to underpay by more than $315,000 as a result of this deception.
Mr. Garcia-Merlos additionally failed to file tax returns for his companies and underreported his wages on his own tax returns. The State of New Jersey is seeking an eight-year prison term and restitution of more than $400,000.
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More Charges in Las Vegas HOA Scandal
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The indictments continue in the Las Vegas HOA scandal. A lawyer for the Justice Department told the judge in the case that “we expect several indictments before the end of the year.” According to the Las Vegas Review Journal, “a dozen or more” additional people will be charged in the conspiracy.
The judge in the case, Senior U.S. District Judge Lloyd George, told prosecutors that he wanted to address the issue of compensation for homeowners. Currently, defendants have agreed to pay $1.5 million to compensate homeowners associations and banks. Vistana homeowners have claimed that the conspirators got the bulk of a $19 million construction defect settlement.
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Seller Cannot Compel Arbitration for Its Role in Construction Defect Case<
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The buyer of a leaky home in Venice, California cannot be compelled to arbitration with the seller in a construction defect lawsuit, according to a decision in Lindemann v. Hume, which was heard in the California Court of Appeals. Lindemann was the trustee of the Schlei Trust which bought the home and then sued the seller and the builder for construction defects.
The initial owner was the Hancock Park Trust, a real estate trust for Nicholas Cage. Richard Hume was the trustee. In 2002, Cage agreed to buy the home which was being built by the Lee Group. Cage transferred the agreement to the Hancock Park Trust. Hancock had Richard Nazarin, a general contractor, conduct a pre-closing walk through. They also engaged an inspector. Before escrow closed, the Lee Group agreed to provide a ten-year warranty “to remedy and repair any and all damage resulting from water infiltration, intrusion, or flooding due to the fact that the door on the second and third floors of the residence at the Property were not originally installed at least one-half inch (1/2”) to one inch (1”) above the adjacent outside patio tile/floor on each of the second and third floors.”
Cage moved in and experienced water intrusion and flooding. The Lee Group was unable to fix the problems. Hume listed the home for sale. The Kamienowiczs went as far as escrow before backing out of the purchase over concerns about water, after the seller’s agent disclosed “a problem with the drainage system that is currently being addressed by the Lee Group.”
The house was subsequently bought by the Schlei Trust. The purchase agreement included an arbitration clause which included an agreement that “any dispute or claim in Law or equity arising between them out of this Agreement or any resulting transaction, which is not settled through mediation, shall be decided by neutral, binding arbitration.” The warranty the Lee Group had given to Hancock was transferred to the Schlei trust and Mr. Schlei moved into the home in May 2003.
Lindemann enquired as to whether the work done would prevent future flooding. Nazarin sent Schlei a letter that said that measures had been taken “to prevent that situation from recurring.” In February, 2004, there was flooding and water intrusion. Lindemann filed a lawsuit against the Lee Group and then added the Hancock Park defendants.
The Hancock Park defendants invoked the arbitration clause, arguing that Lindemann’s claims “were only tangentially related to her construction defect causes of action against the Lee Group.” On June 9, 2010, the trial court rejected this claim, ruling that there was a possibility of conflicting rulings on common issues of law. “With respect to both the developer defendants and the seller defendants, the threshold issue is whether there was a problem with the construction of the property in the first instance. If there was no problem with the construction of the property, then there was nothing to fail to disclose.” Later in the ruling, the trial court noted that “the jury could find there was no construction defect on the property, while the arbitration finds there was a construction defect, the sellers knew about it, and the sellers failed to disclose it.” The appeals court noted that while Hancock Park had disclosed the drainage problems to the Kamienowiczs, no such disclosure was made to Sclei.
The appeals court described Hancock Park’s argument that there is no risk of inconsistent rulings as “without merit.” The appeals court said that the issue “is not whether inconsistent rulings are inevitable but whether they are possible if arbitration is ordered.” Further, the court noted that “the Hancock Park defendants and the Lee Group have filed cross-complaints for indemnification against each other, further increasing the risk of inconsistent rulings.”
The court found for Lindemann, awarding her costs.
Read the court’s decision…
Largest Per Unit Settlement Ever in California Construction Defect Case?
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
BusinessWire reports that the Chelsea Court Homeowners Association has settled their construction defect case for $5.4 million. That works out to $169,000 per unit, which BusinessWire describes as “California’s largest per-unit recovery known to be on record to date.”
Most of the money in the settlement is coming from insurance companies for the builder and thirteen subcontractors. Issues included roof and window leaks, deck failures, and unsafe walkways.
Read the full story...
Construction Firm Sues City and Engineers over Reservoir Project
October 28, 2011 — CDJ Staff
The city of Fremont, Ohio and Arcadis have been sued by Trucco Construction. Trucco had been hired by the city to build a reservoir designed by Arcadis, the News-Messenger reports. Peter Welin, attorney for Trucco, said that he found “startling evidence of the company’s negligence” when he deposed Arcadis engineers. “This project could never be built the way they bid it.”
Their suit alleges that Arcadis and the city were aware that the site was not conducive to construction and also that Arcadis failed to be a neutral party in discussions between Trucco and the city regarding compensation.
Sam Wamper, an attorney for Fremont, said he was going to file a motion which would include “quite an interesting story,” but declined to elaborate.
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Architect Not Liable for Balcony’s Collapse
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The Texas Supreme Court declined to hear an appeal from a woman who was partially paralyzed due to the collapse of a balcony. She had sued the architect of her friends’ home, but the Texas Third Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed a jury ruling against the architect, Sinclair Black. Black’s firm, Black + Vernooy, had designed the home and had supervised “administration of the construction contract.” Despite a contractual obligation to “endeavor to guard the owner against defects and deficiencies,” the balcony builder had not followed the architect’s specifications, including in the construction of the balcony.
While the jury found Black liable for ten percent of the blame, Black argued that he could not be held liable for the contractor’s negligence, nor did he have any duty to third parties.
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Houses Can Still Make Cents: Illinois’ Implied Warranty of Habitability
March 1, 2011 — Original Story by
Marisa L. Saber Cozen O’Connor Subrogation & Recovery Law BlogIn a report published earlier this week Marisa L. Saber writes about the implied warranty of habitability in the context of construction defect litigation. The piece speaks of the difficulties in alleging tort theories against builders and vendors in light of Illinois’ expansion of the economic loss doctrine, and how the implied warranty of habitability may provide another avenue for recovery.
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Texas Court of Appeals Conditionally Grant Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Anderson
April 25, 2011 — April 25, 2011 Beverley BevenFlorez - Construction Defect Journal
The Texas Court of Appeals conditionally grant mandamus relief to Anderson Construction Company and Ronnie Anderson (collectively “Anderson”)… from the trial court in a construction defect lawsuit filed by Brent L. Mainwaring and Tatayana Mainwaring. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.001-.007 (West 2000 & Supp. 2010). Relators contend the trial court abused its discretion by compelling discovery while the case was abated by operation of law.
The Court of Appeals opinion describes what led up to the proceedings: “The Mainwarings’ original petition identified certain defects in their Anderson-constructed home. Those defects concerned the roof trusses and framing, air conditioning, mortar and masonry, exterior doors and windows, and weep holes. With respect to the five areas of defects identified in their original petition, the Mainwarings gave Anderson the statutorily required notice on January 13, 2010. After implementing agreed extensions, Anderson made an offer of settlement for the defects the Mainwarings identified in their notice. Almost eight months later, the Mainwarings filed an amended petition adding defects they had not included in their original petition and notice. The additional defects the Mainwarings included in their amended petition had not been addressed by Anderson’s offer of settlement.”
Following these events, Anderson claimed the Mainwarings did not respond in writing to their settlement offer. “Anderson filed a verified plea in abatement on December 2, 2010. In the trial court, Anderson claimed that the Mainwarings failed to respond in writing to Anderson’s settlement offer, as required by Section 27.004(b) of the RCLA. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(b)(1). The Mainwarings moved to compel discovery responses from Anderson. The Mainwarings alleged that they rejected Anderson’s settlement offer, and that if their response was insufficient, they contend that Anderson’s offer was rejected by operation of law on the twenty-fifth day after the Mainwarings received it. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(i). The Mainwarings’ motion to compel was not supported by affidavit. See Tex. Prop. Code Ann. 27.004(d)(2). On January 13, 2011, Anderson filed a verified supplemental plea in abatement. Anderson alleged that the Mainwarings failed to provide written notice concerning the newly alleged defects and complained the Mainwarings were attempting to circumvent the inspection and resolution procedure of the RCLA. Over Anderson’s objection that the lawsuit had been abated, the trial court granted the Mainwarings’ motion to compel discovery.”
After listening to both sides, the Court of Appeals offered this reasoning for their opinion: “The parties do not dispute that Anderson inspected the property before the Mainwarings alleged the existence of additional defects in their amended pleading, nor do the Mainwarings claim that Anderson has been given an opportunity to inspect the additional defects the Mainwarings identified in their amended pleadings. We conclude the trial court did not have the discretion to deny or lift the abatement until the Mainwarings established their compliance with the statute. In other words, the Mainwarings are required to provide Anderson a reasonable opportunity to inspect the additional defects identified by their amended pleading, which will allow Anderson the opportunity to cure or settle with respect to the newly identified defects.”
The Court of Appeals spoke directly on the issue of mandamus relief: “The Mainwarings contend that mandamus relief is not available because the trial court’s ruling does not prevent Anderson from making settlement offers during the discovery process. ‘An appellate remedy is “adequate” when any benefits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’ In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004). The failure to abate a case is typically not subject to mandamus. See In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 85 S.W.3d 193, 196 (Tex. 2002) (citing Abor v. Black, 695 S.W.2d 564, 567 (Tex. 1985)). In this case, however, the case was abated by operation of law. By ignoring the statutory abatement, the trial court interfered with the statutory procedure for developing and resolving construction defect claims. See In re Kimball Hill Homes Tex., Inc., 969 S.W.2d 522, 525 (Tex. App. Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding) (An appeal provides an inadequate remedy for the trial court’s failure to observe automatic abatement pursuant to the RCLA.). The benefits of mandamus review are not outweighed by the detriments of mandamus review in this case.“
In conclusion, “The trial court had no discretion to compel discovery while the case was abated, and Anderson, who has been compelled to respond to discovery during a period the case was under an automatic abatement, has no adequate remedy on appeal. Accordingly, we conditionally grant the petition for writ of mandamus. The writ will issue only if the trial court fails to vacate its order of February 3, 2011, and fails to refrain from proceeding with the case until a motion to reinstate is filed that establishes compliance with the notice and inspection requirements of the Residential Construction Liability Act.”
Read the trial court’s decision…
Homeowner’s Policy Excludes Coverage for Loss Caused by Chinese Drywall
November 18, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
Exclusions barred the homeowners from recovering for losses caused by Chinese drywall in their home. Ross v. C. Adams Const. & Design, L.L.C., 2011 La. App. LEXIS 769 (La. Ct. App., released for publication Oct. 5, 2011).
Two years after purchasing their home, the Rosses began experiencing chronic malfunctions in the heating, ventilation and air conditioning system. After discovering the presence of gypsum drywall, or "Chinese drywall", they submitted a claim to their insurer, Louisiana Citizens Property Insurance Company, for damages caused by the Chinese drywall. Louisiana Citizens denied the claim.
The Rosses sued. The trial court granted summary judgment to Louisiana Citizens based upon exclusions in the policy.
On appeal, the appellate court first agreed the Rosses had sustained a direct physical loss. The inherent qualities of the Chinese drywall created a physical loss to the home and the drywall had to be removed and replaced.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
Preparing for Trial on a Cause of Action for Violation of Civil Code section 895, et seq.
May 10, 2012 — Samir R. Patel, Esq., Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP
In 2002, the California Legislature enacted the Right to Repair Act (hereinafter “SB-800”), as codified in Title VII of the Civil Code. As set forth in Civil Code section 895, et seq., SB-800 established a set of standards for residential construction, and provides a statutory protocol to address alleged violations of those standards. SB-800 applies to all new single family homes sold after January 1, 2003, and it created its own cause of action governed completely by its own terms, in that in order to state a cause of action under SB-800, a plaintiff may only allege a violation of the Act. (Civ. Code, § 938.) Under Civil Code sections 896, 897, 943, and 944, the Legislature made it clear that it intended to create a single cause of action for construction defects in homes that fall under the purview of SB-800. By passing SB-800, the Legislature eliminated multiple and often redundant or conflicting causes of action, burdens of proof, statutes of limitations, and types of damages that were common in construction defect actions prior to the enactment of the same.
Civil Code section 895, et seq. has significantly changed the landscape of construction defect lawsuits. Yet, for years, the only attention given to the statutes focused solely on the codified pre-litigation process that requires plaintiffs and builders to meet and confer regarding defects and attempt a process to repair the alleged defects before litigation is pursued. A major impediment to the implementation of the pre-litigation procedures has often been that the statutes specifically state that the information obtained during the pre-litigation process is admissible at trial. Hence, through use of the pre-litigation process, plaintiffs’ counsel can engage in a builder funded fishing expedition and later use the information obtained to advance their litigation goals. As such, many builders have chosen to opt out of codified pre-litigation process altogether, an option which the builder can elect within their Purchase and Sale Agreements.
Recently, counsel for builders throughout California have turned their attention to the “exclusive remedy” aspect of SB-800 by seeking, often successfully, to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Civil Code section 943 makes clear that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 performance standards is a plaintiff’s sole remedy for a residential construction defect action. Civil Code section 943 states:
Except as provided in this title, no other cause of action for a claim covered by this title or for damages recoverable under 944 is allowed. (Civ. Code, § 943.) Â
The question remains: what is the benefit of requiring plaintiffs to trim down their complaint and eliminate their tried and true common law causes of action, and requiring them to pursue only a single cause of action for violation of SB800?
The construction standards enumerated within SB-800 include fifty-plus functionality standards. On their face, any benefit to pursuing a construction defect action under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800 initially appears trivial at best, in light of the fact that a jury may be very confused with the complexity of the functionality standards set forth within the Civil Code. Nevertheless, Title VII of the Civil Code actually contains numerous provisions that builders can utilize to their benefit throughout the process of construction defect litigation, including during preparation for trial.
First and foremost, counsel for builders can assert numerous affirmative defenses that will be beneficial if the matter proceeds to trial. These affirmative defenses, as codified in Civil Code section 945.5, include mitigation, in whole or in part, for damages caused by: an unforeseen act of nature; a homeowner’s failure to allow reasonable and timely access for inspections and repair under the pre-litigation procedures; the homeowner’s failure to follow the builder’s recommendations and commonly accepted homeowner maintenance obligations; ordinary wear and tear; misuse; abuse; or neglect. Builders should include these affirmative defenses within their responsive pleadings and as trial approaches, prepare appropriate motions in limine and request special jury instructions regarding the same. As frustrated builders and their attorneys are well aware, many construction defect suits result from a homeowner’s failure to properly maintain their property in a manner that is consistent with normal maintenance procedures and guidelines. Furthermore, within the ten year statute of limitations for most defects, ordinary wear and tear is often attributable to numerous deficiencies alleged by plaintiffs. The affirmative defense for a homeowner’s failure to allow inspections and repairs is also vital, as plaintiffs’ counsel may encourage a homeowner to forego the repair and seek monetary damages, allowing plaintiffs’ counsel to ultimately obtain their share of attorney’s fees. Therefore, the SB-800 statutes provide the builder with recourse and distinctive mitigation defenses that were previously and confusingly mixed into tort and contract related defenses. These affirmative defenses can also be utilized by counsel during the cross-examination of plaintiff homeowners and expert witnesses. Defense counsel should fully grasp these defenses and utilize them as defense themes throughout litigation.
As a plaintiff is limited to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800, if defense counsel has failed to properly eliminate excessive tort and contract causes of action prior to trial, a motion for summary adjudication, or at the very least, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should be brought to limit the introduction of evidence outside of a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Practical judges are always looking for ways to streamline and expedite trials, and they are currently ruling that SB-800 is the exclusive remedy available to plaintiffs. In fact, plaintiffs’ firms in SB-800 matters are now voluntarily limiting their complaints to this one cause of action.
Special jury instructions can also be crafted to limit a jury’s computation of damages pursuant to Civil Codesection 944, which provides the method for computing damages within a construction defect action, as follows:
If a claim for damages is made under this title, the homeowner is only entitled to damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title, the reasonable cost of repairing any damages caused by the repair efforts, the reasonable cost of repairing and rectifying any damages resulting from the failure of the home to meet the standards, the reasonable cost of removing and replacing any improper repair by the builder, reasonable relocation and storage expenses, lost business income if the home was used as a principal place of a business licensed to be operated from the home, reasonable investigative costs for each established violation, and all other costs or fees recoverable by contract or statute. (Civ. Code, § 944.) [Emphasis added.]
Civil Code section 944 specifically prohibits recovery for damages outside the scope of its explicit language as it states “the homeowner is only entitled to ... damages for the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards set forth in this title....” [Emphasis added.] The statute ultimately provides a “reasonableness” standard for the computation of damages that did not exist when computing damages on traditional common law tort and contract claims. Therefore, defense counsel should prepare special jury instructions to limit evidence of damages introduced at trial to the reasonable value of repairing any violation of the standards, and to exclude any evidence of damages beyond the reasonableness standard. Defense counsel should seize the opportunity to utilize the theme of “reasonableness” when attacking plaintiffs’ allegations and plaintiffs’ proposed repair methodology throughout the discovery process and at trial.
Defense counsel may also prepare a motion in limine or special jury instruction regarding the limitation of evidence regarding defects that did not cause resultant damage. Civil Code section 897 states:
Intent of Standards
The standards set forth in this chapter are intended to address every function or component of a structure. To the extent that a function or component of a structure is not addressed by these standards, it shall be actionable if it causes damage. (Civ. Code, § 897.) [Emphasis added.]
Defense counsel can argue that the introduction of any evidence supporting a claim for construction-related deficiencies that are not enumerated within Civil Code section 896, or for deficiencies where no damage has occurred is prohibited and must be excluded at trial. This requirement of resultant damages is familiar as the general rule was previously established in Aas v. Superior Court (2000) 24 Cal.4th 627, in which the California Supreme Court held that there is no tort recovery for construction defects that have not actually caused property damage. The legislature effectively codified this rule within Civil Code section 897.
A motion in limine can also be crafted to limit expert testimony to the standards enumerated in Civil Code section 896, and to deficiencies that caused damage pursuant to Civil Code 897. The motion in limine can be based upon Civil Code section 943 and the fact that claims for defects in homes which were sold after January 1, 2003 may only be pursued under a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. As such, expert testimony should be controlled by the standards set forth in Civil Code section 896. Furthermore, throughout a construction defect matter, defense counsel should ensure that their experts are well versed with the standards and that they can provide testimony that utilizes the same. Defense counsel’s knowledge of the standards will also be helpful during the cross-examination of plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.
If, despite the efforts of defense counsel, the complaint still has numerous causes of action, or if only some homes fall under the purview of SB-800 while others do not, defense counsel can utilize a motion to bifurcate trial. The motion’s basis is that a cause of action for violation of SB-800 will require the introduction of evidence regarding the violations of the fifty-plus standards, and the tort and contract-based claims would also require the introduction of a wide range of evidence to prove each cause of action. For example, in order to prove the tort causes of action, plaintiffs must prove elements such as: duty, breach, proximate and actual causation, and that the builder placed the homes into the stream of commerce. (See Richards v. Stanley (1954) 43 Cal.2d 60, 63; Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 224, 227.) On the contract causes of action, plaintiffs must prove the existence of a valid written contract for the sale of the home, including proof regarding the existence of basic contractual elements such as offer, acceptance, and consideration. (Civ. Code, § 1624 subd. (a); Roth v. Malson (1997) 67 Cal.App.4th 552, 557.) Defense counsel can argue that exposing the jury to elements that may or may not be applicable to all of the homes in the action will complicate and confuse the jury. Thus, concurrently exposing the jury to the SB-800 claims and the non-SB-800 claims will necessitate undue consumption of time, and create the substantial danger of undue prejudice of confusing the issues or misleading the jury.
One of the most important and relevant features of the SB-800 statutes is that they include shortened statutes of limitation as to certain enumerated defects. The codified statutes of limitations apply from the date of “close of escrow,” and are much more definitive than statutes of limitations regarding tort and contract claims. Therefore, they can be utilized within a motion for summary adjudication in cases where only one or a few defects are alleged. For example, under Civil Code section 896, et seq., there is a five year limitation on paint (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(1)); a four year limitation on plumbing fixtures (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (e)); a three year limitation on landscaping (Civ. Code § 896, subd. (g)(12)); and a one year limitation on irrigation systems and drainage (Civ. Code, § 896, subd. (g)(7)). The non-SB-800 claims are subject to a four year statute of limitation for patent defects and a ten year statute of limitation for latent defects. (See Code of Civ. Proc., §§ 337.1, 337.15.) The contrast between the statute of limitations for the SB-800 claims and non-SB-800 claims can complicate a matter at trial, further establishing the necessity to limit plaintiffs to a single cause of action for violation of SB-800. Hence, defense counsel should also utilize a motion to bifurcate the statute of limitations issues from the issue of liability if a question of fact exists. If successful on the motion to bifurcate, plaintiff’s counsel will be barred from the introducing evidence at trial regarding a defect where the statute of limitations has run.
Defense counsel should also seek to simplify the construction standards for the jury. Ultimately, by drafting jury instructions and a special verdict form that is easy to navigate, counsel can promote an easy interpretation of the standards enumerated within the Civil Code. The best route for drafting a special verdict form is to draft it as a check-list, similar to a traditional real estate walk-through check-list. By incorporating the shortened statutes of limitations into the special verdict form, defense counsel can effectively frame the case for the jury. The special verdict form should also allow the jury to easily eliminate any claim for damages that is mitigated, in whole or in part, through the codified affirmative defenses. Defense counsel should also consider drafting a trial brief that effectively and simplistically provides the trial court judge with an understanding of the specific defects before the court, and simultaneously notes which Civil Code standards are implicated and the scope of the same. If the trial judge is not well versed in construction defect litigation, defense counsel should be all the more careful in breaking down the parameters and limitations codified within SB-800 for the court.
The strategies outlined within this article are only a few tactics that can be utilized to defend a construction defect suit. Depending on the defect allegations within any particular case, defense counsel should become intimately familiar with Title VII of the Civil Code and use all aspects of the same to their advantage. If not, plaintiffs’ counsel will have the advantage during “court-house step” settlement discussions and at trial.
Printed courtesy of Samir R. Patel, Esq. of Lorber, Greenfield, & Polito, LLP. Mr. Patel can be contacted at spatel@lorberlaw.com.
Construction Bright Spot in Indianapolis
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The downtown Indianapolis area is the site of about 85 major building projects that are from groundbreaking to just complete. The Indianapolis Star reports that the cumulative worth of the projects is about $3 billion, a level of construction that Indianapolis has seen only once before.
About thirty of the projects are residential. The main commercial project is a $754 million hospital building. The boom in downtown Indianapolis is not matched elsewhere, with the Indianapolis Star reporting that in the rest of Central Indiana, construction has slowed.
Read the full story…
History of Defects Leads to Punitive Damages for Bankrupt Developer
March 1, 2012 — CDJ Staff
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has ruled that evidence of construction defects at a developer’s other projects were admissible in a construction defect lawsuit. They issued their ruling on Magnolia North Property Owners’ Association v. Heritage Communities, Inc. on February 15, 2012.
Magnolia North is a condominium complex in South Carolina. The initial builder, Heritage Communities, had not completed construction when they filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11. The remaining four buildings were completed by another contractor. The Property Owners’ Association subsequently sued Heritage Communities, Inc. (HCI) alleging defects. The POA also sued Heritage Magnolia North, and the general contractor, BuildStar.
The trial court ruled that all three entities were in fact one. On appeal, the defendants claimed that the trial court improperly amalgamated the defendants. The appeals court noted, however, that “all these corporations share officers, directors, office space, and a phone number with HCI.” Until Heritage Communities turned over control of the POA to the actual homeowners, all of the POA’s officers were officers of HCI. The appeals court concluded that “the trial court’s ruling that Appellants’ entities were amalgamated is supported by the law and the evidence.”
Heritage also claimed that the trial court should not have allowed the plaintiffs to produce evidence of construction defects at other Heritage properties. Heritage argued that the evidence was a violation of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. The court cited a South Carolina Supreme Court case which made an exception for “facts showing the other acts were substantially similar to the event at issue.” The court noted that the defects introduced by the plaintiffs were “virtually identical across all developments.” This included identical use of the same products from project to project. Further, these were used to demonstrate that “HCI was aware of water issues in the other projects as early as 1998, before construction on Magnolia North had begun.”
The trial case ended with a directed verdict. Heritage charged that the jury should have determined whether the alleged defects existed. The appeals court noted that there was “overwhelming evidence” that Heritage failed “to meet the industry standard of care.” Heritage did not dispute the existence of the damages during the trial, they “merely contested the extent.”
Further, Heritage claimed in its appeal that the case should have been rejected due to the three-year statute of limitations. They note that the first meeting of the POA was on March 8, 2000, yet the suit was not filed until May 28, 2003, just over three years. The court noted that here the statute of limitation must be tolled, as Heritage controlled the POA until September 9, 2002. The owner-controlled POA filed suit “approximately eight months after assuming control.”
The court also applied equitable estoppel to the statute of limitations. During the time in which Heritage controlled the board, Heritage “assured the unit owners the construction defects would be repaired, and, as a result, the owners were justified in relying on those assurances.” Since “a reasonable owner could have believed that it would be counter-productive to file suit,” the court found that also prevented Heritage from invoking the statute of limitations. In the end, the appeals court concluded that the even apart from equitable tolling and equitable estoppel, the statute of limitations could not have started until the unit owners took control of the board in September, 2002.
Heritage also contested the jury’s awarding of damages, asserting that “the POA failed to establish its damages as to any of its claims.” Noting that damages are determined “with reasonable certainty or accuracy,” and that “proof with mathematical certainty of the amount of loss or damage is not required,” the appeals court found a “sufficiently reasonable basis of computation of damages to support the trial court’s submission of damages to the jury.” Heritage also claimed that the POA did not show that the damage existed at the time of the transfer of control. The court rejected this claim as well.
Finally, Heritage argued that punitive damages were improperly applied for two reasons: that “the award of punitive damages has no deterrent effect because Appellants went out of business prior to the commencement of the litigation” and that Heritages has “no ability to pay punitive damages.” The punitive damages were upheld, as the relevant earlier decision includes “defendant’s degree of culpability,” “defendants awareness or concealment,” “existence of similar past conduct,” and “likelihood of deterring the defendant or others from similar conduct.”
The appeals court rejected all of the claims made by Heritage, fully upholding the decision of the trial court.
Read the court’s decision…
Recent Case Brings Clarity and Questions to Statute of Repose Application
August 16, 2012 — Douglas Reiser, Builders Counsel
I have often chatted about the Washington Statute of Repose on this blog. The Statute of Repose prevents construction claims, for the most part, from being raised 6 years from the date of substantial completion or termination. Well, a recent Court of Appeals case dove deep into the specific determinative factors that tell us when to start the clock. It certainly raises questions about how long we really have to file suit.
The Statute of Repose has been a frequent topic here, so I will simply direct you to my prior post for further information on how this law works. A recent post was published about a lawsuit that might raise some questions about when and how the clock begins to roll, and claim periods begin to diminish.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Douglas Reiser of Reiser Legal LLC. Mr. Reiser can be contacted at info@reiserlegal.com
Ghost Employees Steal Jobs from Legit Construction Firms
September 13, 2012 — CDJ Staff
Firms that skirt labor laws for construction workers can undercut firms that are obeying those laws. In a piece in Raleigh, North Carolina’s News & Observer, Doug Burton, a commercial masonry contractor summed it up: “my competitors are cheating.” The article describes the low-bidding firms “called their workers independent contractors ? or treated them like ghosts, paid under the table and never acknowledged.” The cost to the state is “unpaid medical bills for injured workers, uncollected business and personal taxes, and payments not made to a depleted state unemployment reserve.”
One firm examined in the article, Martin’s Bricklaying, employs mostly immigrant Mexican laborers, many of whom are in the country illegally. One employee told the News & Observer, “we don’t complain.”
Read the full story…
No Coverage for Negligent Misrepresentation without Allegations of “Bodily Injury” or “Property Damage”
February 10, 2012 — Tred Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii
Jeff City Industries was the general contractor for a sewer system improvement project in Branson, Missouri. Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. United HRB Gen. Contractors, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145666 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 19, 2011). Branson sued Jeff City, alleging breach of the construction contract for the project. The claims included improperly bedded sewer piping, improper aligning portions of trenching for the sewer piping, improper service line connections to the sewer piping, etc.
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Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com
“Other Insurance” and Indemnity Provisions Determine Which Insurer Must Cover
September 1, 2011 — Tred Eyerley, Insurance Law Hawaii
A policy’s “other insurance” clause and a contractual indemnity provision were at the root for determining which of two insurers had to cover for injuries at a construction site. Valley Forge Ins. Co. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 76061 (N.D. Calif. July 14, 2011).
Hathaway was the general contractor at a demolition and construction project. Hathaway was insured by Zurich. Reinhardt Roofing was the roofing subcontractor. Reinhardt was insured by Valley Forge under a policy which named Hathaway as an additional insured. The subcontract also required Reinhardt to indemnify Hathaway for acts or omissions arising from Reinhardt’s work unless Hathaway was solely negligent.
Four of Reinhardt’s workers were injured when a canopy roof on which they were working collapsed. At the time of the accident, Hathaway’s on-site supervisor was inspecting a gap in the canopy roof, but did not order Reinhardt’s workers to stop working.
Read the full story…
Reprinted courtesy of Tred R. Eyerly, Insurance Law Hawaii. Mr. Eyerly can be contacted at te@hawaiilawyer.com