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Construction Law Client Alert: Hirer Beware - When Exercising Control Over a Job Site’s Safety Conditions, You May be Held Directly Liable for an Independent Contractor’s Injury

On February 24, 2011, the California Court of Appeal held in Jeffrey Tverberg, et al v. Fillner Construction, Inc. that the imposition of direct liability on a hirer turns on whether the hirer exercised retained control of worksite safety in such a manner that affirmatively contributed to the independent contractor’s injury. Twice, Tverberg, an independent contractor hired by a general contractor's subcontractor, asked the general contractor to make the job site safe by covering up open holes created by another unrelated subcontractor while Tverberg was working at the site. After Tverberg was injured at the site by falling in a hole, he sued both the general contractor and the subcontractor which had hired him.

The Court of Appeal reasoned that when the general contractor instructed another subcontractor to create a condition that was potentially dangerous (i.e., creating open and uncovered bollard holes), and simultaneously required Tverberg to perform unrelated work near the open holes, the general contractor s conduct may have constituted a negligent exercise of its retained control which affirmatively contributed to Tverberg’s injury. The Court also reasoned that the general contractor affirmatively assumed responsibility for the safety of the workers near the holes by only requiring stakes and safety ribbon, and negligently discharged that responsibility which resulted in injury.

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Reprinted courtesy of Mark VonderHaar and Yvette Davis of Haight Brown & Bonesteel. Mr. VonderHaar can be contacted at mvonderhaar@hbblaw.com and Ms. Davis at ydavis@hbblaw.com.

The Ever-Growing Thicket Of California Civil Code Section 2782

California Civil Code section 2782 imposes limits on indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts. Since the initial adoption of S.B. 800¹ in 2002 (eff. January 1, 2003) section 2782² has been revised several times, and legislative history suggests that interest groups representing builders, developers and sub-contractors, as well as the insurance industry, have seen legislative action on these indemnity and defense issues as part of the overall response to the same economic pressures resulting from construction defect litigation that gave rise to S.B. 800. Amendments in 2005, 2007, 2008 and 2011 (each effective January 1 of the following year) have increasingly entangled the provisions of Section 2782 with various provisions of S.B. 800. The application of section 2782 to construction contracts, and in particular contracts between developer-builders and subcontractors, executed after January 1, 2006, will require a concurrent reading and understanding of S.B. 800, the application of which is itself still in flux.

The time a construction contract was executed will likely determine which version of section 2782, read in connection with provisions of S.B.800, is applicable. Because of the nature of construction defect litigation, the determination of relative rights and liabilities of developer-builders vis-à-vis subcontractors under construction contracts does not become the subject of litigation, and legal and judicial interpretation, until years after the contracts were entered and work performed. As of the date this article is submitted, there has been no case law interpreting or applying any of the post S.B. 800 amendments, in part, and perhaps primarily, because litigation arising from construction contracts executed after January 1, 2006, has not yet reached the appellate courts.

SECTION 2782 AT THE TIME S.B. 800 WAS ENACTED

Section 2782 was originally enacted in 1967 and amended several times to the version in effect when S.B. 800 became law, at which time the section was relatively simple and straightforward. It then consisted of two subdivisions, which have essentially remained unchanged until the most recent amendment during the 2011 legislative session.

Section 2782 (a) prohibited, and still prohibits, provisions in construction contracts that “purport to indemnify the promisee against liability for damages for death or bodily injury to persons, injury to property, or any other loss, damage or expense arising from the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promise.” This provision essentially prohibits what had been referred to as so-called Type I or “specific” indemnity provisions. In such agreements, the indemnitor [the promisor, that is, the person or entity indemnifying] will indemnify the indemnitee [the promisee, that is, the person or entity being protected by the indemnity] for the indemnitee’s own negligence, whether active or passive, whether the indemnitee is solely negligent or concurrently negligent with the indemnitor. (See, MacDonald & Kruse, Inc. v. San Jose Steel Co. (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 413, 419.)³ Section 2782 (a) has remained essentially intact since the enactment of S.B. 800. It still must be considered and applied to interpret a construction contract. Generally, it will apply to contracts not involving a public agency; the next part of section 2782 specifically governs such contracts.

The second subdivision prohibits provisions in any construction contract with a public agency which purport to impose on the contractor, or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency. Subdivision (b) has been revised by the 2011 amendment, discussed below. If a construction contract with the public agency is for residential construction, the standards of S.B. 800 likely apply.⁴

This was the extent of section 2782 on January 1, 2003, when S.B. 800 went into effect, and remained so until January 1, 2006. This version will govern interpretation and application of indemnity and defense provisions in construction contracts executed before January 1, 2006.⁵

2005 AMENDMENT

The first “post S.B. 800” change to Section 2782 was in enacted in 2005, effective January 1, 2006, and added two new sections. Subdivision (c) stated (in somewhat greater detail than paraphrased here) that for residential construction contracts, or amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, a subcontractor cannot be required to indemnify (including the cost to defend) a builder for construction defects that arise out of negligence or design defects of the builder or other independent contractors, or that do not arise out of the scope of the subcontractor=s scope of work. The term “residential construction” was defined by reference to S.B.800 generally, and the term “builder” was defined by reference to section 911 (a part of S.B. 800), for the first time expressly connecting provisions of section 2782 to S.B. 800. Contractual provisions not expressly prohibited were reserved to the agreement of the parties.

What subdivision (c) took away was partially given back by subdivision (d). It stated that “subdivision (c) does not prohibit a subcontractor and builder from mutually agreeing to the timing or immediacy of the defense and provisions for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, so long as that agreement, upon final resolution of the claims, does not waive or modify the provisions of subdivision (c).”⁶ In addition, it stated that this subdivision (c) did not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes, Inc. v. American States Insurance Company (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 571, which holds that where an insurer has a duty to defend a developer pursuant to an additional insured endorsement obtained under a subcontractor’s policy, that duty generally applies to the entire action, even if the suit involves both covered and uncovered claims, or a single claim only partially covered by the policy. Finally, subdivision (d) stated that the amendment did not affect the builder’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800. Both of these latter provisions, relating to the Presley Homes case, and obligations under S.B. 800, have been carried forward essentially intact in subsequent amendments of section 2782.

This version of section 2782 will be applicable to any contract between a builder as defined by section 911 (see fn. 4, above) and a subcontractor executed between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008. Thus, a general contractor, etc., who is not a builder is not subject to the provisions added by the 2005 amendment; this changed with the next amendment.

It is not clear whether this version would apply to a contract entered before January 1, 2006, but amended after that date. Subdivision (c) applies to “all construction contracts, and amendments thereto, entered into after January 1, 2006, for residential construction.” It would seem that the clearest and most logical construction would apply it only to contracts originally made after January 1, 2006, and thereafter amended, but there has been no judicial determination of this issue.

In addition, logically it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1, 2006, and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur.

2007 AMENDMENT

The second “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2007 (effective January 1, 2008), added subdivisions (e)(1) and (e)(2).

Subdivision (e)(1) added general contractors and subcontractors not affiliated with the builder and imposed essentially the same restrictions on provisions to indemnify, including the cost to defend, them as had been imposed on the “builder” by the 2005 amendment. The amendment refers to section 911 (b), again part of S.B. 800, to define general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder.

Subdivision (e)(1) essentially repeated the provisions of subdivision (d) permitting agreement to the timing and immediacy of the defense, the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800.

It appears this amendment was an attempt to harmonize the new restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions with S.B. 800. The 2005 amendment, whether by oversight or intent, covered only builders and not general contractors, although both classes are subject to the provisions of S.B. 800; the 2007 amendment added non-builder-affiliated general contractors.

Again, logically, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to construction contracts for residential construction between a general contractor or contractor not affiliated with a builder and a subcontractor, entered between January 1 and December 31, 2008; however, legislative history relating to the 2008 amendment discussed below suggests a different result might occur. The same potential uncertainty regarding applicability to a contract entered before January 1, 2008, but amended after that date, exists for this provision as for the prior amendment, discussed above.

2008 AMENDMENT

The third “post S.B. 800” amendment in 2008 (effective January 1, 2009), reorganized the language relating to prohibited indemnity provisions, added a reference to insurance in that same prohibition, extensively rewrote the provisions governing agreements relating to the timing or immediacy of defense, added language preserving equitable indemnity claims, and added language defining “construction defect” by reference to the standards set forth in S.B. 800.

Subdivisions (a) and (b) remained unchanged.

Subdivision (c) now made a combined reference to builders (again by reference to section 911), as well as general contractors or contractors not affiliated with the builder (again by reference to section 911 (b)), rather than dealing with the two groups in separate but nearly identical subdivisions as previously. It otherwise restated the same limitations that were previously set forth separately in subdivisions (c) and (e), as well as the reference to the Presley Homes case, and the general contractor’s or subcontractor’s obligations under S.B. 800, but with one important addition. The word “insure” was added to the description of prohibited provisions, to-wit: “provisions? that purport to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, the builder, [etc.]? are unenforceable” to the extent they arise out of claims of the type previously described.

It is unclear what impact the addition of this single word “insure” will have; and, it will have to be read in light of the preservation of the language that it shall not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under the holding of the Presley Homes case. Suppose a carrier had issued an additional insured endorsement under which it would otherwise be required to defend a builder or general contractor consistent with the Presley Homes rule: would this newly added single word (restricting the construction contract, to which the carrier is not a party) give the carrier a basis for denying coverage under the insurance contract? Or would the continued inclusion of the express language that it does not affect the obligations of an insurance carrier under Presley Homes control? That is surely an issue that will have to be worked out by the courts.

The new subdivision (d) addressed defense obligations. Again it permitted parties to agree to the timing and immediacy of the defense and provision for reimbursement of defense fees and costs, but imposed a very detailed scheme that appears to limit the extent of such agreement. A subcontractor owes no defense or indemnity obligation until the builder or general contractor provides a written tender of the claim, which has the same force and effect as notice of commencement of a legal proceeding. Upon that tender the subcontractor shall elect to follow one of two ways of performing: subdivision (d) (1) permits the subcontractor to defend with counsel of its choice and to control the defense, if the subcontractor gives written notice of this election within a reasonable time after receipt of the written tender and in no event later than 90 days following that receipt; subdivision (d) (2) provides an alternative by which the subcontractor pays a reasonable allocated share of the builder’s or general contractor’s defense fees and costs within 30 days of receipt of an invoice, subject to reallocation upon final resolution of the claim by settlement or judgment. Subdivision (e) sets forth remedies available to the builder or general contractor if a subcontractor fails to timely and adequately perform its obligations under either of the two alternatives in subdivision (d), including compensatory and consequential damages, reasonable attorneys’ fees in connection with the first alternative, and interest on defense and indemnity costs in connection with the second alternative. Subdivision (e) ends with provisions relating to reallocation of defense costs, and damages for failure to reallocate.

Application of these requirements in actual litigation is likely to be cumbersome and potentially fraught with conflicts. If retained pursuant to subdivision (d) (1) does the attorney represent the builder, the subcontractor, or both? To whom does the attorney owe his or her fiduciary duty? Can an appropriate informed written consent be formulated, for example, under Rule 3-310 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct, or Rule 1.7, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct? Could an attorney retained by a subcontractor blame the subcontractor if that is in the developer’s best interests? If multiple subcontractors elect to defend directly, how would the defense be coordinated among the potentially multiple attorneys so retained? Would an attorney retained by one subcontractor be able, or inclined, to blame another subcontractor who also chose to defend directly, in other words, what would prevent inconsistent defense positions amongst the various counsel retained by subcontractors for the developer? There may be solutions to such practical and professional considerations but it seems an ethical thicket awaits any attorney involved in such circumstances.

Subdivision (e) and (f) preserve equitable indemnity claims for the builder, general contractor or subcontractor, the first in general, the second as against any supplier, design profession, or product manufacturer. Finally, the 2008 amendment added for the first time, in subdivision (h), language defining "construction defect" as used in section 2782 as a violation of standards set forth in S.B. 800.

The inclusion of these last three subsections would seem to work against simplification of litigation. A builder or general contractor is likely to allege a claim for equitable indemnity against any and all subcontractors in addition to claims for contractual indemnity and defense (however limited by the other provisions of section 2782). Nothing in the section suggests the subcontractor should, or even can, somehow take on the representation of the builder, etc., in connection with a claim of equitable indemnity back against the subcontractor.

And the limited definition of “construction defect” in subdivision (h) appears to raise an issue of the applicability of the limitations set forth in subdivision (c). Although there is a school of thought that section 941 limits residential construction defect claims only to breach of the performance standards under S.B. 800, it is still common for CD complaints to plead other legal theories, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., in addition to violation of S.B. 800 standards. With the addition of subdivision (h) it is arguable that the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions spelled out in subdivisions (c) and (d), both of which relate to claims for residential construction defects, are applicable only to claims for violation of S.B. 800 standards, and not other residential construction defect claims. In other words, a developer might conceivably still be entitled to a broader scope of indemnity and concomitant defense for other types of claims, such as breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, etc., so long as the indemnity does not violate the limitation of subdivision (a) against Type I indemnity, which as noted above, has remained intact through these revisions.

Finally, it would seem that this version of section 2782 should be applicable to contracts executed between builders, general contractors, etc., on the one hand and subcontractors on the other hand on and after January 1, 2009. And, as noted above in connection with the 2005 and 2007 amendments, logic would suggest that those versions would ordinarily apply to contracts executed during the time periods mentioned above. But, the Legislative Counsel’s Digest for the 2008 amendment as it finally was enacted into law includes the following statements:

This bill would delete the provisions applicable to construction contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2008, that purport to indemnify the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder. The bill would revise the provisions applicable to contracts entered into after January 1, 2006, to instead apply to contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, and to apply to agreements that purport to insure or indemnify the builder or the general contractor or contractor not affiliated with the builder, as described.

Although it seems a startling result, this legislative history suggests an argument can be made that the 2008 amendment retroactively nullified the effect of the 2005 and 2007 amendments, so that contracts executed from January 1, 2006, as to builders or January 1, 2008, for general contractors, etc., through December 31, 2008, are still governed by the provisions of section 2782 as it was on the books prior to the first post-S.B. 800 amendment in 2005.

2011 AMENDMENT

Section 2782 has been amended yet again in the 2011 session of the California Legislature, effective January 1, 2012; however, the substantive changes affect certain contracts entered on or after January 1, 2013. All of the provisions contained in the 2008 amendment have been carried forward in the most recent amendment, although re-numbered: (c) became (d), etc., through (h) becoming (i). So, the law governing construction contracts entered into after January 1, 2009, for residential construction, as between a builder, or a general contractor, etc., not affiliated with a builder, and regarding insurance, indemnity or defense relating to claims for construction defects, remains the same as in the 2008 amendment.

As noted above the substantive changes to section 2782 all affect contracts entered into on or after January 1, 2013. Subdivision (b) has been amended such that any provision in a contract with a public agency that purports to impose on any contractor, etc., or relieve the public agency from, liability for the active negligence of the public agency will be void and unenforceable. A new subdivision (c) has been added that imposes a similar restriction on construction contracts with the owner of privately owned real property to be improved and as to which the owner is not acting as a contractor or supplier of materials or equipment to the work. This new restriction in subdivision (c) does not apply to a homeowner performing a home improvement project on his or her own single family dwelling.

The 2011 bill amending section 2782 also added a new section 2782.05, which will make void and unenforceable any provision in any construction contract (again, entered on or after January 1, 2013) that purports to insure or indemnify, including the cost to defend, a general contractor, construction manager, or other subcontractor, by a subcontractor for claims that arise out of the active negligence or willful misconduct of the general contractor, etc., or other independent contractors, etc., or to the extent the claims do not arise out of the scope of work of the subcontractor. However, the section also includes a long list of situations to which it does not apply, including all of those covered by section 2782 (residential construction subject to S.B. 800, public agency contracts subject to section 2782 (b), and direct contracts with private property owners subject to the new section 2782 (c)) as well as eight other categories. This apparently is intended to serve as a “catch-all” to extend a limitation on indemnity agreements to all construction contracts not previously swept into this widening legislative scheme, although the exact phrasing is slightly different.⁷

The new section 2782.05 then permits a mutual agreement to the timing or immediacy of a defense under a scheme essentially identical to that imposed in the 2008 amendment to section 2782: defend with counsel of choice, and maintain control of the defense; or, pay a reasonable allocated share of defense fees and costs. The same logistical and ethical difficulties presented by the 2008 scheme discussed above would likely be present in cases that fall under the new section 2782.05.

CONCLUSION

The California Legislature has been revising section 2782 since shortly after the adoption of S.B. 800. Each revision has been more complicated than the last, and each has tied certain provisions of section 2782 more closely to S.B. 800. In particular, with regard to construction defect claims relating to residential dwellings which are subject to S.B. 800, the Legislature has apparently attempted to exercise more and more control over the scope of allowable indemnity and dictated a very narrow scheme to govern how the defense obligation arising from a contractual indemnity is to be implemented. It seems likely that any attempt to manage the defense of a construction defect case under the options that allow a subcontractor to defend directly and control the defense will create a logistical problem and an ethical difficulty for any attorney attempting to defend a developer at the behest and direction of a subcontractor. Finally, as set forth in the current version of section 2782 relating to contractual indemnity and defense of S.B. 800 type cases (subdivisions (c) through (h) in the 2008 version, now subdivisions (d) through (i) in the 2011 amendment), the Legislature has apparently narrowed the application to only claims of violation of S.B. 800 standards. This may have, in essence, removed the restrictions on indemnity and defense provisions as they relate to other theories pleaded against developers in construction defense cases, e.g., breach of contract, breach of warranty, negligence, and the like. It is not at all clear that the Legislature has accomplished what it set out do accomplish. Rather, the law may have come full circle back to where it began, except for one legal theory, i.e. violation of S.B. 800 standards, currently being used in residential construction defect cases. For any other legal theory the limitation of section 2782 (a) may be solely controlling.

1. California Civil Code section 43.99, and sections 895 to 945.5.
2. All statutory references in this article are to the California Civil Code unless otherwise specified.
3. Type I or specific indemnity does not exactly match the scope of proscribed indemnity as described in section 2782 (a) but it is the closest. More recent case law in California has eschewed a mechanical application of the MacDonald & Kruse typology in favor of examining the precise text of the actual contract (See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Frontier Pacific Ins. Co. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1234, 1246, n. 6) but some recent cases still use the Type I, II and II classifications. And, an understanding of that “historical” typology is useful as an aid to evaluating and understanding express indemnity in general.
4. The provisions of S.B. 800 other than the prelitigation procedures of sections 910 through 938 apply to general contractors, subcontractors, etc., pursuant to section 936. The prelitigation procedures generally involve a “builder,” which is specifically defined in section 911 (a) by reference to entities or individuals in the business of selling residential units to the public or of building, developing, or constructing residential units for public purchase. Pursuant to section 911 (b) the term builder does not include general contractors, etc., not affiliated with the builder. Thus, a general contractor who constructs residential housing pursuant to a contract with a public agency is still subject to claims for violation of the standards set forth in sections 896 and 897, resulting from its negligent act or omission or breach of contract, pursuant to section 936.
5. As noted above, there has been no case law yet interpreting any of the “post S.B. 800” changes to Section 2782. One of the most important legal decisions relating to express indemnity and defense obligations and rights between developer-builders and sub-contractors was published after two of the amendments but based upon contracts executed and the language of section 2782 prior to January 1, 2006. (See, Crawford v. Weather Shield Mfg., Inc. (2008) 44 Cal.4th 541, 547, 566-67, fn. 14).
6. Subcontractor dissatisfaction with the perceived inadequacy of protection afforded by this provision apparently became the impetus for a 2008 amendment to section 2782, discussed below, at least based upon the numerous (form) letters submitted to legislators in connection therewith.
7. Section 2782 (a), where we started, and which has continued without change, prohibits indemnity for claims arising out of the sole negligence or willful misconduct of the promisee; sole negligence can be either active or passive. The various versions relating to residential construction prohibit indemnity for the negligence of the builder, etc., suggesting there is no express contractual indemnity for the negligence of the subcontractor if the builder, etc., is at all negligent. This is tempered a bit by the preservation of the right to equitable indemnity, which will now be found in section 2782 (g) and (h).

Courtesy of Michael D. Worthing of Borton Petrini, LLP. Mr. Worthing can be contacted at mworthing@bortonpetrini.com.

Construction Defect Case Not Over, Despite Summary Judgment

The Supreme Court of Oregon has concluded in an en banc decision that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment is not a motion for a new trial. In coming to their conclusion the court overturned an earlier Oregon Supreme Court case, Carter v. U.S. National Bank. Although the decision does not bear on construction defects, the underlying case did. Due to the decision, these claims can now be evaluated in a trial.

The case, Association of Unit Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren, came about after an apartment complex was converted into condominium units. The developers hired Big Al’s Construction for some of the remodeling work. The condominium association later sued the developer and the contractor over claims of construction defects. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the court granted.

But that wasn’t the end of things. The plaintiff soon filed a “motion to reconsider,” noting that the summary judgment seemed to be in conflict with both law and other recent rulings, and additionally, the grounds for the decision were not in the order. The judge then notified the parties that the court had “pulled the trigger too quickly” and had seven questions for the parties to answer.

The court dismissed all claims against the defendants. The defendants filed their responses, objecting that that “‘there is no such thing’ as a motion for reconsideration.” Further, while “the rules do allow for post-judgment review of pre-judgment rulings through a motion for a new trial,” the plaintiffs had not filed for a new trial. But did they need one? They did file an appeal.

The judge in the case admitted that there was no such thing as a motion to reconsider, and felt bad about prematurely signing the judgment. The case was sent to the Court of Appeals to determine if the motion to reconsider was a request for a new trial. The Court of Appeals concurred.

In reviewing the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that there were a maximum of three questions to address. Was the motion for reconsideration a motion for a new trial? If so, was the later notice of appeal premature? And if so, was the plaintiff required to file a new appeal? The court determined that the answer to the first question was no.

Prior decisions pointed to the conclusion “that a motion for reconsideration of a summary judgment amounts to a motion for a new trial,” but here the court concluded that “our prior cases erred,” and turned to the summary judgment rule for clarification. The court noted that “the rule contemplates that summary judgment and trial are separate and distinct events.” With this conclusion, the Oregon Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

Read the court’s decision…

Harsh New Time Limits on Construction Defect Claims

A recent Colorado Supreme Court decision, Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., 230 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2010), considerably shortens the time limit for bringing many construction defect lawsuits. Homeowners and homeowner associations risk losing the right to seek reimbursement from builders, developers and other construction professionals unless they carefully and quickly act upon discovery of evidence of any potential construction defect.

The Statute of Limitations for Construction Defect Claims
Colorado’s construction defect statute of limitations limits the time for homeowners and homeowners associations to bring lawsuits for construction defects against “construction professionals,” including developers, general contractors, builders, engineers, architects, other design professionals, inspectors and subcontractors. The statute requires homeowners and associations to file suit within two years “after the claim for relief arises.” A claim for relief “arises” when a homeowner or association discovers or reasonably should have discovered the physical manifestation of a construction defect.

The two-year time limitation applies to each construction defect separately, and will begin to run upon the appearance of a “manifestation” of a construction defect (which may include, for example, a condition as simple as a roof leak or drywall cracks), even if the homeowner or association does not know the cause of the apparent problem.

The Smith Opinion and its Effect on the Statute of Limitations
In Smith v. Executive Custom Homes, Inc., the plaintiff homeowner, Mrs. Smith, slipped on ice that had accumulated on her sidewalk because of a leaking gutter and suffered injury. When she first noticed the leak, she reported it to her property manager, who reported it to the builder. The builder attempted to repair the gutter, unbeknownst to Mrs. Smith, and she did not notice further problems until approximately one year after she first observed the leak, when she fell and suffered serious injury. She sued the builder within two years of her injury, but nearly three years after she first learned of the leak.

The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed Mrs. Smith’s claims as untimely and held that under the construction defect statute of limitations, the two-year period for suing for injuries due to construction defects begins when the homeowner first observes the physical manifestation of the defect, even if the resulting injury has not yet occurred. The court acknowledged that this ruling could result in “unfair results,” especially if a serious and unforeseeable injury occurs more than two years after the first time the homeowner noticed the problem, and as a result the victim is unable to seek redress from those responsible for the defect.

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Reprinted courtesy of Scott F. Sullan, Esq., Mari K. Perczak, Esq., and Leslie A. Tuft, Esq. of Sullan², Sandgrund, Smith & Perczak, P.C., and they can be contacted through their web site.

Contract Not So Clear in South Carolina Construction Defect Case

The South Carolina Court of Appeals has reversed a partial summary judgment issued by one of the lower courts in the case of The Retreat at Edisto Co-Owners Association v. The Retreat at Edisto. The underlying issues of the case deal with a construction defect complaint.

The lower court had concluded “Developer’s ‘First Amendment’ to the Master Deed required the Developer to satisfy the provision in the paragraph labeled ‘Master Deed Amendment or Phase II’ as a condition precedent to its election to proceed with the development of Phase II.”

The appeals court found that “the language of the First Amendment to the Master Deed is susceptible to more than one interpretation.” The court additionally concluded that the “Developer presented the requisite scintilla of evidence on the question of its intent in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact. As the material facts were in dispute, the appeals court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Read the court’s decision…

United States District Court Confirms That Insurers Can Be Held Liable Under The CCPA.

In D.R. Horton, Inc.-Denver v. The Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 10-CV-02826-WJM-KMT, 2012 WL 527204 (D. Colo. Feb. 16, 2012), the court was asked to rule on Travelers’[1] motion to dismiss D.R. Horton, Inc. ?Äì Denver’s (“DRH”) claim that Travelers violated the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (“CCPA”).

In the underlying construction defect case (“CD case”), DRH, as the developer and general contractor of a construction project, tendered the defense of the CD case to certain subcontractors and to Travelers as an insurer to those subcontractors. Travelers accepted the duty to defend DRH. DRH hired counsel to defend it, and the attorney fees and costs of suit were billed to Travelers. However, for a period of over five years, Travelers failed to actually pay any portion of the defense of DRH. Finally, on October 31, 2008, Travelers offered checks for payment of only 4% of the costs and fees incurred. DRH then returned the checks to Travelers and provided Travelers with authority to support its position that the amounts in Travelers’ checks were inadequate. Thereafter, Travelers dug its heels in, and resubmitted the same checks.

DRH was then forced to file a coverage action against Travelers for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, bad faith breach of insurance contract, and deceptive trade practices under the CCPA. In its motion to dismiss DRH’s CCPA claim, Travelers’ argued that DRH failed to plead specific facts that Travelers engaged in a deceptive trade practice under C.R.S. § 6-1-105, and DRH failed to plead sufficient facts showing that Travelers’ actions significantly affect the public ?Äì a necessary element of a CCPA claim.

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Reprinted courtesy of Chad Johnson, Higgins, Hopkins, McLain & Roswell, LLC. Mr. Johnson can be contacted at johnson@hhmrlaw.com

No Choice between Homeowner Protection and Bankrupt Developers?

Donna DiMaggio Berger, writing in the Sun Sentinel argues those may be the only current choices in Florida. A recent court case, Lakeview Reserve HOA v. Maronda Homes has caused a swift response from the legislators. Ms. Berger notes that the construction defect bill, HB 1013, “would take away a homeowner’s rights to pursue a developer for defects to the driveways, roads, sidewalks, utilities, drainage areas and other so-called ‘off-site’ improvements.” The alternative? She notes that applying the Maronda decision would “bankrupt developers who don’t build defect-free roads and sidewalks.”

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Arizona Homeowners Must Give Notice of Construction Defect Claims

Chris Combs of the Combs Law Group notes that “the new home construction industry is recovering” and that some of the buyers of these homes “will have claims for construction defects.” But not so quick on filing that claim.

Under Arizona law, as Mr. Combs notes the law “requires that, at least 90 days before filing any lawsuit, the buyer furnish notice by certified mail to the homebuilder specifying in detail the construction defect.” Only if there is no agreement over proposed repair can the homeowner file a lawsuit.

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Construction on the Rise in Washington Town

The Kitsap Sun reports that Gig Harbor, a town in the area near Tacoma, Washington, has had a 60% increase in building permit applications as compared to 2010. May, 2011 had as many permits issued for single-family residences in Gig Harbor as were issued for all of 2010. Additionally, a Safeway shopping center on Point Fosdick is described by Dick Bower, Gig Harbor Building and Fire Safety Director, as “a huge project and it’s going to bring in quite a bit of revenue.” He called the increase in building “economic recovery at the grassroots level.”

Bower said that the building officials in other towns have also seen upswings in construction. He anticipates more activity in the future.

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Fire Reveals Defects, Appeals Court Affirms Judgment against Builder

The Arizona Court of Appeals has ruled in the case of Simms v. Nance Construction. After a fire damaged his home, Jerry Simms discovered some construction defects in the work of the builder, Nance Construction. Nance Construction completed the home in 2000 and it was damaged by fire in 2001. In the course of Simms’ suit against his neighbor, “defense experts opined both that Dusty Creek had negligently repaired the damage to Simms’ residence and that many defects found in the houses were the result of defects in the original construction.” Nance offered to make roof repairs. Simms responded with a list of “numerous construction defects,” stating this was “not a comprehensive and final list of items.” Nance offered to repair some while disputing others. Simms entered a lawsuit against Nance and other parties.

Nance first sought a summary judgment, “asserting that Simms had failed to adequately disclose the repairs for which he sought to hold Nance responsible.” The court denied this. It also would not allow Nance to introduce evidence that Simms had been denied a license by the Arizona Department of Gaming over “questionable business practices, illegal activities, and financial transactions with a person purportedly involved in organized crime.”

During the suit, Simms contracted with Advanced Repair Technologies “for repairs that included a complete remodel of the roof and the exterior stucco system.” Nance later claimed that the cost of ART’s repair was unreasonable, claiming that it should have cost about $600,000 instead of the $1.5 million for which Simms contracted. The jury found against Nance, with a judgment of $870,200 of which half was due to the roofing subcontractor.

After the verdict, Nash moved for a new trial, stating that the jury should have heard expert testimony on whether the contract price was reasonable. Nance also “argued that the trial court had erred in refusing to allow Nance to impeach Simms’ credibility with his purported prior acts of dishonesty.” These motions were denied and Nance appealed.

The appeals court upheld the trial court on all counts. The court found that, despite the contention made by Nance, the jury had sufficient information to determine if the cost of the repairs were reasonable. The court also found that Simms had given Nance an opportunity to propose repairs. The law, however, “does not require the Plaintiff to accept an offer for repairs,” adding that “the record makes clear that the parties were far apart in their belief of the nature of repairs necessary.” Nor did the court find that Nance should have been allowed to introduce evidence to impeach Simms’ credibility.

Although judgment of the lower court was affirmed, the court took the discretion to decline to award attorneys’ fees to Simms, although he was awarded costs.

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Exact Dates Not Needed for Construction Defect Insurance Claim

The Texas Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court in Vines-Herrin Custom Homes v Great American Lloyds Insurance Company on December 21, 2011. Vines-Herrin Custom Homes built a single-family home in Plano, Texas in 1999. They obtained a commercial general liability policy from Great American, later purchasing coverage from Mid-Continent, which the decision describes as “a sister company of Great American.”

While the home was under construction, Emil G. Cerullo sought to purchase it. At the time, it was under contract to another buyer. Two months later, Vines-Herrin told Cerullo that the deal had “fell through.” Cerullo bought the house with modifications from the original plan. Upon moving in, Cerullo began having water intrusion and other problems. “Cerullo noticed water gathering on window sills and damage to the sheetrock and baseboard.” Additional problems followed, including cracks, leaks, “and in early 2002, the ceiling and roof began to sag.”

Cerullo sued Vines-Herrin, claiming negligent construction. Vines-Herrin filed a claim seeking defense and indemnification under the insurance policies. Coverage was denied and Vines-Herrin filed suit to require coverage and also bringing claims for “breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, breach of contract, and DTPA and insurance code violations.”

In May, 2006 Vines-Herrin stated that it had no more defense funds and went into arbitration with Cerullo. The underlying construction defect action was settled for about $2.5 million. As part of the settlement, “Cerullo became the rightful owner of all remaining claims, rights, and causes of action against” Vines-Herrin’s insurers. He then joined the coverage lawsuit.

The non-jury trial was held under the controlling law of the time which “imposed a duty to defend only if the property damage manifested or became apparent during the policy period.” The court concluded in Cerullo’s favor. During the post-judgment motions, the Texas Supreme Court rejected the manifestation rule. Under this ruling, the trial court set aside its judgment and found in favor of the insurance companies. The trial court noted that although “the Residence was covered by an uninterrupted period of insurance (which began before the Residence was constructed) and that the damages to the Residence manifested during the uninterrupted period of insurance coverage,” “Mr. Cerullo failed to allege the date when actual physical damage to the property occurred.”

The first claim by Cerullo and Vines-Herrin was that the “Final Judgment” occurred in October 2004, and that all proceedings thereafter were void. The court rejected this as the “final judgment” is not “final for the purposes of an appeal unless it actually disposes of every pending claim and party or unless it clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and all parties.” Despite the use of the word “final,” the trial court’s decision did not do this.

The second issue was the application of the Texas Supreme Court case Don’s Building Supply Inc. v. OneBeacon Insurance. In this case, framing rot due to defective stucco was not discovered until after the end of the policy period. The Supreme Court noted that “the key date is when injury happens, not when someone happens on it.”

The appeals court found that the trial court misapplied the Don’s Building Supply decision. Rather than an exact date, “so long as that damage occurred within the policy period, coverage was provided.” The appeals court noted that “Cerullo alleged the house was constructed in 1999 and he purchased it in May 2000.” “By April of 2001, Cerullo noticed that the windowsills in the study were showing signs of leakage and water damage.” As the court put it, “the petitions then alleged a litany of defects.”

The court noted that coverage by Great American was in effect from November 9, 1999 to November 9, 2000. In May of 2000, the house suffered “substantial flooding from a rainstorm that caused damage.” This was during the policy period. “As a matter of law, actual damages must occur no later than when they manifest.”

The court concluded that as damage manifested during the period of coverage, so must have the damage. The court ruled that “contrary to the trial court’s determination otherwise, the evidence showed Great American’s duty to indemnify was triggered, and expert testimony establishing the exact date of injury was not required to trigger the duty.”

Read the court’s decision…

High School Gym Closed by Construction Defects

The high school gym in Lake Oswego, Oregon has been shut down because testing has revealed that the construction defects have lead to deterioration of the structural integrity of the roof. The school district noted that there was a chance of collapse if there were a “significant seismic event or heavy rain and winds and snow.” The school district has been in a lawsuit with the builders since 2008, which was recently settled for $600,000.

The school board is still determining whether the original contractor will be asked to correct the defect or if they will bid the job out.

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Workers Hurt in Casino Floor Collapse

More than a dozen construction workers fell about thirty feet when a floor collapsed in a Cincinnati casino. The workers were pouring cement on the second-floor level when the accident happened. The area in question will be the gaming area in the completed casino. Scott Allen, OSHA’s regional spokesperson, said their investigation of the accident would probably take about a month to complete.

The cause of the collapse is still undetermined. Although the weather has been wet in the area, experts thought it unlikely to be the cause. A construction forensics professor at Ohio State University said that “concrete pouring is very common” and that “you cannot go wrong unless something happens with the connection.” Engineering experts said it was more likely an issue with the metal decking.

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Australian Group Seeks Stronger Codes to Combat Dangerous Defects

The Owners Corporation Network, a group that represents condominium owners in Australia, has raised concerns about building defects in high-rise building that can lead to safety problems. The group prepared a statement which would strengthen the rights of owners, but the government official, Fair Trading Minister Anthony Roberts, declined to sign it. A spokesperson for the group cited a fatal fire at a Sydney high rise, noting that “there had been issues of certification which has been a concern of the Owners Corporation Network.” The Australian Broadcasting Network reports that the government will be reviewing the laws concerning high-rise apartment buildings.

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Unfinished Building Projects Litter Miami

Buildings born in ambitious development plans that were never brought to completion form a grim reminder of the building bust in Miami, according to an article in the Miami Herald. One project started in 2007 as a residential project, later there were hopes to develop it as a hotel. These plans are ten months old with no work done.

Another project was projected as a 30-story office and commercial tower. Four were built before the project was abandoned. The article describes the site as “squalid.” Another project completed the planned 17 stories, but no work has been done beyond constructing the shell. Once planned as luxury condos, the owner owes more than $30,000 in property taxes.

Each of the three sites profiled in the Miami Herald have become dumping grounds for trash. The building skeletons have also become damaged by the elements. Some abandoned projects have been taken over by homeless people. Businesses near the abandoned properties have been hurt. The buildings also represent failed obligations to subcontractors who have put liens on the properties for work they performed but were never paid for.

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Statute of Repose Dependant on When Subcontractors Finished

Scott C. Sandberg of Snell and Wilmer writes a post on the JDSupra site about the Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Shaw Construction v. United Builder Services. Sanberg notes that when the general contractor was sued by an HOA, the contractor turned around and sued its subcontractors. The contractor made three claims. They claimed that “improvement” referred to the whole project, that “substantial completion” was reached when the architect certified completion, and that the statute of repose was tolled by the HOA’s service of a Construction Defect Action Reform Act notice.

The subcontractors claimed that “improvement” only referred to their specific work, which reached “substantial completion” when they finished, despite work to be done by other later, and the HOA’s notice to the contractor did not affect the subcontractors. The Colorado court agreed with the subcontractors.

Sandberg notes that some of the contractor’s were not addressed by the court, noting that “the court did not decide whether an improvement triggering the statute of repose can be determined on a trade-by-trade basis,” and that “the court did not decide whether substantial completion occurs when a certificate of occupancy is issued or when the architect certifies completion.”

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Failure to Meet Code Case Remanded to Lower Court for Attorney Fees

Judge Patricia J. Cottrell, ruling on the case Roger Wilkes, et al. v. Shaw Enterprises, LLC, in the Tennessee Court of Appeals, upheld the trial court’s conclusion that “the builder constructed the house in accordance with good building practices even though it was not in strict conformance with the building code.” However, Judge Cottrell directed the lower court to “award to Appellants reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in their first appeal, as determined by the trial court.”

Judge Cottrell cited in her opinion the contract which specified that the house would be constructed “in accordance with good building practices.” However, after the Wilkes discovered water leakage, the inspections revealed that “that Shaw had not installed through-wall flashing and weep holes when the house was built.” The trial court concluded that:

“Separate and apart from the flashing and weep holes, the trial court concluded the Wilkeses were entitled to recover damages for the other defects they proved based on the cost of repair estimates introduced during the first and second trials, which the court adjusted for credibility reasons. Thus, the trial court recalculated the amount the Wilkeses were entitled to recover and concluded they were entitled to $17,721 for the value of repairs for defects in violation of good business practices, and an additional 15%, or $2,658.15, for management, overhead, and profit of a licensed contractor. This resulted in a judgment in the amount of $20,370.15. The trial court awarded the Wilkeses attorneys” fees through the Page 9 first trial in the amount of $5,094.78 and discretionary costs in the amount of $1,500. The total judgment following the second trial totaled $26,973.93.”

In this second appeal, Judge Cottrell concluded, that “the trial court thus did not have the authority to decide the Wilkeses were not entitled to their attorneys” fees and costs incurred in the first appeal.”

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Don MacGregor To Speak at 2011 West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar

“Challenges for Experts in Construction Defect Claims and Litigation” will be held Thursday May 13, 2011 between 1:30 and 3:00 PM at this year’s West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar. Among the various topics covered will be of Right to Repair/Opportunity to Repair statutes, improper testing methodologies, new challenges where a case involves a Wrap Policy, OCIPS, CCIPS, and other owner controlled insurance programs, as well as the need for realistic testing protocols for the party the expert is retained to represent.

During the presentation Mr. MacGregor will be working in connection with a group of construction and design experts each of which have extensive experience with construction defect and claims related litigation. This particular session is expected to attract a standing-room only crowd, drawing in excess of 1700 attendees.

The West Coast Casualty Construction Defect Seminar is the largest seminar of its type. This year’s event is scheduled for will take place on May 12 and 13, 2011, at The Disneyland Hotel and Resort. For more information regarding the years event please visit http://www.westcoastcasualty.com/dyncat.cfm?catid=3322